

1 ROB BONTA  
Attorney General of California  
2 ANYA M. BINSACCA  
Supervising Deputy Attorney General  
3 RYAN EASON  
DAVID GREEN  
4 IRAM HASAN  
S. CLINTON WOODS  
5 JENNIFER E. ROSENBERG  
Deputy Attorney General  
6 State Bar No. 275496  
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702  
7 Los Angeles, CA 90013-1230  
Telephone: (213) 269-6617  
8 Fax: (916) 731-2124  
E-mail: Jennifer.Rosenberg@doj.ca.gov  
9 *Attorneys for Defendants California Secretary of  
State Shirley Weber and Governor Gavin Newsom*  
10

11 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
12 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
13 WESTERN DIVISION  
14

15 **DAVID TANGIPA, et al.,**  
16 Plaintiffs,  
17 and  
18 **UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,**  
19 Plaintiff-Intervenor  
20

21 v.

22 **GAVIN NEWSOM, in his official**  
**capacity as the Governor of**  
23 **California, et al.,**  
24 Defendants,  
25 and  
26 **DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSIONAL**  
**CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE,**  
27 Defendant-Intervenor.  
28

2:25-cv-10616-JLS-WLH-KKL

**DECLARATION OF DR.  
BERNARD GROFMAN  
SUPPORTING DEFENDANTS'  
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'  
AND PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS'  
MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY  
INJUNCTION**

Judge: Hon. Josephine L.  
Staton, Hon. Kenneth K.  
Lee, and Hon. Wesley L.  
Hsu  
Trial Date: None Designated  
Action Filed: 11/05/2025

**DECLARATION OF BERNARD GROFMAN**

I, Dr. Bernard Grofman, declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the statements in the report attached as Exhibit A to this declaration, and appendices attached to the report, are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on December 3, 2025 in Irvine, California.

*Bernard Grofman*

Dr. Bernard Grofman

# **EXHIBIT A**

**TO DECLARATION OF GROFMAN**

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## INITIAL EXPERT WITNESS REPORT OF BERNARD GROFMAN

### I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I, Bernard Grofman, have prepared this report at the request of the California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General in *Tangipa et al. v. Newsom, et al.*, No. 2:25-cv-10616 (C.D. Cal. 2025). Attached as Appendix A to this Report are tables that include data informing my analysis in this Report. Attached as Appendix B to this Report is a copy of my curriculum vitae.

As a result of conducting a fact-based evaluation of the Prop 50 map, I conclude that partisanship was the predominant motive in drawing the Prop 50 map, and the map was a fully efficient partisan gerrymander. I further concluded that there was no credible expert witness evidence that race was a predominant motive.

### II. BACKGROUND AND QUALIFICATIONS

I am a Distinguished Professor of Political Science Emeritus at the University of California, Irvine. For over a decade I served as the Jack W. Peltason Endowed Chair of Democracy Studies and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. My research deals primarily with issues of representation, including minority voting rights and party competition.

I am a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. I have an honorary Ph.D. from the University of Copenhagen for my work on the cross-national study of elections and voting rules. I am the recipient of a lifetime achievement award from the American Political Science Association for my work on elections and voting rights. I am co-author of six books with major university presses (Cambridge (4), Oxford (1), Yale (1)) and am the sole author of a book with a commercial press on statistical sampling theory as applied to elections, published in 2025. I am co-editor of 26 other books, (including books with Oxford (3), U. Michigan (4), and Princeton (1)). I have co-authored and single-authored over 300 research articles and book chapters.

I have served as an expert witness in cases involving voting rights in nearly a dozen states for a variety of entities, including the United States Department of Justice, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, non-partisan redistricting authorities, and the Democratic and Republican parties. Beginning in 2015 I have served as a special master or senior mapping consultant to draw or review remedial maps for six different federal courts, including redrawing a Virginia congressional district and eleven districts in the Virginia House of Delegates, redrawing Virginia congressional and legislative districts again in a subsequent decade, reviewing state legislative districts in Michigan, and redrawing or reviewing districts in local elections in Georgia, Virginia, and Utah. I have also worked as the senior mapping consultant to the special masters appointed by the North Carolina State Supreme Court in a case involving partisan gerrymandering as defined under state law. My work (or work in volumes I have edited) has been cited in about a dozen different United States Supreme Court cases, perhaps most notably in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), and in various state and federal court cases.

In early November of 2025, I was asked by the Office of the California Attorney General to prepare an expert report in *Tangipa v. Newsom*, a case concerning a congressional district map that, according to unofficial results, a majority of voters voted in favor of adopting in the referendum conducted on November 4, 2025. I am being compensated at a rate of \$700 per hour. All opinions in this report are strictly my own, and my compensation is not contingent on my opinions in this case, nor is my compensation contingent on the outcome of this case.

My extensive familiarity both with cases involving allegations of racial preponderance, *see. e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections*, Civil Action No. 3:14cv852 (2020), and cases involving Section 2, *see, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (especially footnotes 21 and 27), along with my knowledge of the tools used to effectuate gerrymandering,<sup>1</sup> allowed me to prepare an expert witness report within the tight deadlines at this stage of the case.

### III. MATERIALS CONSULTED AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

In reaching conclusions for my evaluations of Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff-Intervenors' allegations of a racially predominant motive and Section 2 non-compliance, I reviewed the following materials: Plaintiffs' complaint (filed November 5, 2025); Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and supporting materials (filed November 5, 2025); Plaintiff-Intervenor's complaint in intervention and supporting materials (filed November 13, 2025); Plaintiff-Intervenor's motion for a preliminary injunction and supporting materials (filed November 13, 2025); the reports of Dr. Thomas Brunell and of Dr. Sean Trende, filed by Plaintiffs; replication data for the Brunell and Trende reports; a report titled "Latino Voters and the November 2025 Special Election: Redistricting and Representation" by Dr. Raquel Centeno and Dr. Jarred Cuellar;<sup>2</sup> press releases and media reports to which I cite in the text of this Report, including a NALEO (National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials) Report titled "California's Fast-Growing Latino Electorate: An Election 2024 Portrait;"<sup>3</sup> and I accessed publicly accessible elections data on the California Secretary of State website,<sup>4</sup> and publicly accessible data from the 2020 U.S. Census.

Using Dave's Redistricting App (DRA),<sup>5</sup> I reviewed basic demographic facts and geography, including data on citizen voting age population (CVAP)<sup>6</sup> for the 2021 congressional district map

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<sup>1</sup> *See e.g.,* Owen, Guillermo, and Bernard Grofman. 1988. Optimal partisan gerrymandering. *Political Geography Quarterly*, 7(1):5-22.

<sup>2</sup> Available at <https://www.cpp.edu/class/political-science/docs/media/proposition-50.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Available at [https://naleo.org/COMMS/PRA/2024/CA\\_Latino\\_Eligible\\_Electorate\\_Portrait\\_-\\_Final.pdf](https://naleo.org/COMMS/PRA/2024/CA_Latino_Eligible_Electorate_Portrait_-_Final.pdf).

<sup>4</sup> For example, <https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2024-general/ssov/pres-by-political-districts.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> Dave's Redistricting App, or the DRA, is widely used software program that is publicly available at no cost to users. It provides demographic and political data on congressional and legislative maps and allows users to create maps of their own.

<sup>6</sup> Citizen voting age population (CVAP) refers to United States population that are both citizens

that was prepared by the California Citizens Redistricting Commission (CRC) and used for elections in 2022 and 2024 (the CRC map), the map submitted by the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee to the California legislature, and the map offered by the legislature on the Prop 50 Referendum held on November 4, 2025 (Prop 50 map).<sup>7</sup> I reviewed adjusted CVAP data from the California Statewide Database.<sup>8</sup>

#### IV. WHAT IS A PARTISAN GERRYMANDER?

A *partisan gerrymander* is one that seeks to achieve three goals:

- It can be expected to reduce the number of seats held by the other party.
- It can be expected to preserve and protect the safe seats of its own party.
- It can be expected to shore up the seats of its most if not all of its vulnerable incumbents.

A partisan gerrymander can be thought of as “efficient” if it is likely to achieve these three goals, and as “fully efficient” if it is also drawn in such a fashion that its effects are likely to be durable. Overall, partisan gerrymanders are concerned with efficient distribution of partisan voting strength across districts.

There are four basic tools used to achieve a partisan gerrymander:

- a. *cracking* geographic blocs of strength of the opposite party by splitting them across two or more districts, or more generally, redrawing districts by removing some of the voters who support the other party;
- b. *reinforcing*, i.e., redrawing districts by adding voters to the district who primarily favor the party in charge of the redistricting (or have special ties to its candidate) to “shore up” vulnerable incumbents of the line-drawing party, or to reduce the election chances of the opposite party in districts presently held by the opposition party;
- c. *kidnapping*, i.e., relocating incumbents of the opposite party in a district that deprives them of some or many of their previous voters/supporters and/or effectively forces them

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and of voting age. CVAP data is generated by the Census’s American Community Survey (ACS) based on a yearly survey of around 3.5 million addresses, aggregated for greater precision into five-year blocs. In the text and tables, I report CVAP data for the five-year period ending in 2023 from the legislature’s current website, and I supplemented that recent data with ACS data on CVAP for the five-year period ending in 2019. While, like the Census, the ACS is conducted by the Census Bureau, the methodologies are different: ACS is a sample survey; the Census is an enumeration. Because it is a sample, ACS data is generally considered reliable only when applied to relatively large geographic areas. No data on citizenship was collected in the 2020 Census.

<sup>7</sup> The data underlying the maps is available at <https://aelc.assembly.ca.gov/proposed-congressional-map>.

<sup>8</sup> Available at [https://statewidedatabase.org/d20/2025\\_cvap.html](https://statewidedatabase.org/d20/2025_cvap.html) and [https://statewidedatabase.org/d10/2021\\_cvap.html](https://statewidedatabase.org/d10/2021_cvap.html).

to compete against a candidate of their own party (*pairing*) if they wish to remain in office; and

d. *packing*, i.e., creating some districts in which the opposite party's electoral support is wasted because those districts are being won overwhelmingly by candidates of the opposite party, and these wasted votes are unavailable to help that party win other districts.

My emphasis in this report is on a fact-based evaluation of the evidence for partisanship as the predominant motive in the map as compared to the evidence for race as the predominant motive in the map. I show that the four basic tools of partisan gerrymandering identified have been used in the Prop 50 map to create an *efficient partisan gerrymander*. Because that partisan gerrymander is expected to be durable, I characterize the map as a *fully efficient partisan gerrymander*.

## V. OPINION

In this Report, I first discuss evidence showing that the Prop 50 map had partisan gain as its predominant motivation both overall and in specific districts. I focus on tools that are used to achieve a partisan gerrymander and show that all were skillfully used to create a “fully efficient” partisan gerrymander. I then turn to show that the claims that race is the predominant motive for the Prop 50 map as a whole or for particular districts such as CD 13 are misleading or false. Finally, I include a brief discussion on evidence of motivation. The data supporting the conclusions stated below are provided in the form of Tables 1A-3B in **Appendix A** to this Report, or in material that is cited.<sup>9</sup>

### A. Partisanship is the Predominant Motive Underlying the Prop 50 Map, as Judged by its Effects

(1) In potentially competitive districts held by Republican incumbents, on net, Democratic leaning voters were added for partisan purposes, turning five of the nine Republican districts into ones where Democrats have a reasonable chance of success in future congressional elections using the Prop 50 map.<sup>10</sup> In three of these five districts with Republican incumbents (CD 1, CD 3, CD 41), the Cook Political Report<sup>11</sup> forecasts a Democratic victory in 2026, while the

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<sup>9</sup> Note that results in most of the tables in Appendix A are reported in terms of percentages of the total vote, not percentage of the two-party vote. Two-party vote shares can be calculated from the data in the tables. Also note that, for simplicity, the labeling of districts is consistent as to number, e.g., CD 1 in the Prop 50 map is being compared to CD 1 in the CRC map, etc. The boundaries of districts with the same number do not match perfectly given the nature of the redraw needed to achieve a partisan gerrymander.

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix A, Table 1A.

<sup>11</sup> The Cook Report provides evaluations of the likely outcomes in United States House and Senate Districts and state governorships in both primaries and general elections. These evaluations are regarded as of high credibility based on a long track record. I have cited to two different Cook Reports. *Compare 2026 CPR House Race Ratings*, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/557146>,



Republican-held CD 22 (rated “lean Republican” in 2024), and CD 48 (rated “solid Republican” in 2024) are now labeled as “tossups” under the Prop 50 map.<sup>12</sup>

(2) In several of these Republican held districts, especially the five where the Prop 50 map make it more likely that a Democrat would win in the 2026 election, the lines were substantially redrawn for partisan purposes. CD 41, with the Republican incumbent having his district kidnapped out from under him, is the extreme case. In CD 41, the Democrats were able to generate a result that led to a pairing of Republican incumbents, thus eliminating at least one Republican incumbent using one of the classic tools of partisan gerrymandering identified above.<sup>13</sup>

(3) In three districts where the electoral geography did not readily permit adding Democrats, or where Republican voting strength made it highly unlikely that the district could be turned into a Democratic seat (CD 5, CD 20 and CD 23), either the district was left essentially unchanged, or some Republicans were added to the district. This preserved or reinforced the “packing” of these three districts with Republican voters, thus “wasting” some Republican votes for partisan purposes. Republican votes were also added to CD 40 under the Prop 50 map, converting it from a competitive Republican seat into a seat with excess Republican strength, thus further wasting Republican votes for partisan purposes.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps more importantly, the removal of Republicans into CD 40 helped allow for the creation of CD 41 as a clearly Democratic open seat.<sup>15</sup>

(4) Turning now to the Democratic side of the gerrymandering equation, I find that all eight seats with Democratic incumbents that were competitive seats in terms of 2024 Democratic Presidential vote share had their Democratic vote share raised to improve Democratic chances in these competitive seats.<sup>16</sup> Using Cook Report ratings, I find that five of the eight districts registered an improvement in their chances of success in electing a Democrat in 2026 under the Prop 50 map, as compared to under the CRC map, while the election chances in the three others remain essentially unchanged across the two maps.<sup>17</sup>

(5) The 35 remaining seats with Democratic incumbents averaged a 64.9% Democratic share

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*with 2026 CPR House Race Ratings*, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/558166>; *see also*, Erin Covey, *California’s Newly Passed Map Spurs 11 Ratings Changes*, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/analysis/house/redistricting/californias-newly-passed-map-spurs-11-ratings-changes> (describing changes in the Cook Political Report’s ratings—“all but one shifting in Democrats’ direction”—in the wake of California Voters approving Prop 50).

<sup>12</sup> See Appendix A, Table 3A.

<sup>13</sup> Tom Coulter *After Prop 50 passage, GOP Rep. Ken Calvert will run in new district*, Palm Springs Desert Sun, <https://www.desertsun.com/story/news/politics/elections/2025/11/05/prop-50-results-ken-calvert-will-run-in-new-district/87109804007/> (last visited Nov. 27, 2025).

<sup>14</sup> See Appendix A, Tables 1A, 3A.

<sup>15</sup> See Appendix A, Table 1A.

<sup>16</sup> See Appendix A, Table 1B.

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix A, Table 3B.

of the 2024 Presidential election in the CRC map. These districts were characterized as solid Democratic vis-à-vis the election of 2026 by the Cook Report just prior to the passage of Prop 50.<sup>18</sup> The average Democratic vote share in the 2024 Presidential election in these districts was reduced to 63.1% in the Prop 50.<sup>19</sup> These 35 districts classified by the Cook Report as “solid prior to the passage of Prop 50 under the CRC map”, remained solid Democratic seats under the Prop 50 map according to the Cook Report.<sup>20</sup>

(6) The reduction in Democratic strength in districts that were already solid Democratic seats and were kept that way, helped the Democratic gerrymander find enough Democratic votes both to shore up its vulnerable incumbents, and also to expect to pick up a substantial portion of the previously Republican-held districts under the Prop 50 map by increasing the expected Democratic vote share in those districts.<sup>21</sup>

(7) The redistribution of partisan voting strength in this partisan gerrymander made five of the nine Republican-held seats more likely to elect a Democrat, increased (at least slightly) the reelection chances of potentially vulnerable Democrats, while making sure that none of the previously solid Democratic-held seats was going to be anything other than “solid Democratic” in 2026.<sup>22</sup> This combination of different types of benefits for the party doing the gerrymandering effects is the defining hallmark of a successful partisan gerrymander. In sum, the Prop 50 map was a skillfully crafted *efficient* partisan gerrymander in its effects. And given the safety level for a Democratic candidate of almost all the seats, it is a durable partisan gerrymander for the Democrats.<sup>23</sup> In sum, the data in Table 1B and the evaluations of the Prop 50 map in the Cook Political Report shown in Table 3B lead me to characterize the Prop 50 map as a durable partisan gerrymander, as well as an efficient one. Thus, using the terminology introduced above, the Prop

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<sup>18</sup> See Appendix A, Table 1B, Table 3B and See earlier discussion of the Cook Report data.

<sup>19</sup> See Appendix A, Table 1B

<sup>20</sup> See Appendix A, Table 3B

<sup>21</sup> See Appendix A, Tables 1A, 1B, 3A, 3B.

<sup>22</sup> In creating a partisan gerrymander, there is always the danger of the gerrymander backfiring on the party that created it. In a bad election year for the party, some of its own incumbents may be defeated because the margins of support for potentially vulnerable members of their own party were cut too thin in the desire to move party supporters into other districts to turn those districts into ones which the party could win. I have coined the phrase “dummymander” to capture the case where a gerrymander ostensibly drawn to favor one party ends up benefiting the other party (Grofman, Bernard and Thomas Brunell. 2005. “The Art of the Dummymander: The Impact of Recent Redistrictings on the Partisan Makeup of Southern House Seats.” In Galderisi, Peter (Ed.) Redistricting in the New Millennium, New York: Lexington Books, pp. 183-199). Because the Prop 50 map protected potentially vulnerable Democratic incumbents, as well as previously safe Democrats, while still registering substantial expected seat gains for the Democrats, it is my assessment that the Prop 50 map is not a dummymander.

<sup>23</sup> See the data in Appendix A, Table 1B and the evaluations of the Prop 50 map in the Cook Political Report shown in Appendix A, Table 3B.

50 map should be labeled a “fully efficient partisan gerrymander” for the Democrats.<sup>24</sup>

**B. Evidence that Race was a Predominant Factor in Drawing the Prop 50 Map is Either Flawed or Nonexistent**

(8) Based on the 2023 adjusted CVAP data available from the California Statewide Database<sup>25</sup> and used by the legislature in creating the Prop 50 map,<sup>26</sup> there were sixteen Hispanic-majority<sup>27</sup> seats in the CRC map and sixteen in the Prop 50 map.<sup>28</sup> The assertion that there were only 14 in the CRC map, leading to the claim that two new majority Hispanic CVAP seats have been added in the Prop 50 map, is wrong. It conflates Hispanic CVAP majority districts with districts that elect a person who is himself or herself of Hispanic heritage, who is also a Hispanic community’s candidate of choice.<sup>29</sup> This is an “apples to oranges” comparison fallacy.

(9) A consistent CVAP metric must be used to compare the CRC map with the Prop 50 map. Failing to do so is an “apples and oranges” comparison, the results of which are statistically meaningless. Such a comparison would occur, for example, if one set of data is used to establish the Hispanic CVAP in the CRC map, while a different set of data is used to establish the Hispanic CVAP in the Prop 50 map, and those two different sets of data were used to compare the change in Hispanic CVAP between the two maps, neglecting the fact that there were changes in Hispanic CVAP over two different time periods.

(10) Since the map under challenge is the Prop 50 map, I largely reference the 2023 CVAP data posted on the legislature’s website throughout this Report, because it is the most recent available CVAP data.<sup>30</sup> Using 2023 CVAP data, there are 16 Hispanic majority CVAP districts in both the CRC map and the Prop 50 map. As an alternative metric, in Table 2B in Appendix A to this Report, I also created a consistent measure of Hispanic majority CVAP districts using 2019 CVAP data that was available to the CRC, projecting that metric forward to the Prop 50

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<sup>24</sup> The evaluations of the Prop 50 map in the Cook Political Report are shown in Appendix A, Tables 3A and 3B.

<sup>25</sup> Available at [https://statewidedatabase.org/d20/2025\\_cvap.html](https://statewidedatabase.org/d20/2025_cvap.html).

<sup>26</sup> Available at <https://aelc.assembly.ca.gov/proposed-congressional-map>.

<sup>27</sup> In this Report, the term “Hispanic” is used to refer to the Hispanic and Latino population. See U.S. Census Bureau, *About the Hispanic Population and its Origin*, <https://www.census.gov/topics/population/hispanic-origin/about.html> (last visited Nov. 29, 2025).

<sup>28</sup> See Table 2A (cf. Table 2B).

<sup>29</sup> A candidate who is himself or herself Hispanic may or may not be elected in a majority Hispanic CVAP, because the Hispanic community’s candidate of choice need not be a member of the Hispanic community, or because turnout levels or cohesion levels among Hispanic voters lead to an outcome that is not the preferred outcome of the Hispanic community. On the other hand, even districts that are not majority Hispanic in CVAP may elect candidates who are the candidates of choice of the Hispanic community..

<sup>30</sup> California Senate Elections and Constitutional Amendments Committee, *Proposed Congressional Map*, <https://selc.senate.ca.gov/proposed-congressional-map> (last visited Nov. 28, 2025).

map. By projecting 2019 CVAP data forward into the Prop 50 map, the results show 16 Hispanic majority CVAP districts in the CRC map using the CRC's CVAP numbers, but only 13 Hispanic majority CVAP districts in the Prop 50 map. The districts that were majority Hispanic CVAP in the CRC map that are no longer majority Hispanic CVAP under the Prop 50 map using 2019 CVAP data are CD 13, CD 25, and CD 46. Two of these were just barely above 50% Hispanic CVAP in the CRC map. In this alternative calculation, there is again no evidence that race was being used in those districts in a predominant fashion in the Prop 50 map since, using this alternative metric, there are now fewer Hispanic majority CVAP districts in the Prop 50 map than in the CRC map.<sup>31</sup>

(11) More generally, looking at all 16 of the Hispanic majority CVAP districts in the Prop 50 map, I find that 10 districts went down in Hispanic CVAP relative to the districts with the same number in the CRC map and only 5 went up, with one district, CD 34, remaining completely unchanged in Hispanic CVAP.

### 1. Dr. Sean Trende's Report

(12) **CD 13.** The assertion by Dr. Trende that CD 13 exhibits a racially predominant motive is wrong. This claim is based on nitpicking or cherry-picking the data. The configuration of CD 13 in the Prop 50 map is very much politically motivated, namely, to make CD 13 more likely to elect a Democrat in future election. Most importantly, the political effects are not achieved by race conscious means. The Hispanic CVAP share of CD 13 actually goes down from the CRC map to the Prop 50 map, while in contrast, the Democratic share goes up by 3 percentage points in the Prop 50 map compared to the CRC map, using 2023 CVAP data.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, while Dr. Trende highlights in his report a handful of areas where it might have been possible to add to CD 13 White population that was heavily Democratic rather than Hispanic population that was heavily Democratic, he also observes that there were areas where Hispanic population could have been added but was not added.<sup>33</sup> Because we can look at the overall change in Hispanic vote share between the CRC map and the Prop map in CD 13, we can see that the areas highlighted by Dr. Trende are unrepresentative of the overall results, which involve a decline in Hispanic CVAP percentage in the Prop 50 CD 13 as compared to the CRC CD 13.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, in his Report, Dr. Trende acknowledges that the Prop 50 map increased the Democratic vote share in the district compared to the CRC map.<sup>35</sup>

(13) **CD 13 (continued).** Dr. Trende also asserts that it would have been possible to draw a more compact District 13 with fewer Hispanic voters. But of the two standard compactness measures (Reock and Polsby-Popper),<sup>36</sup> Dr. Trende's own data shows the Prop 50 CD 13

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<sup>31</sup> See Table 2A in Appendix A to this Report for calculations based on 2023 CVAP data. See also Table 2B in Appendix A for calculations based on 2019 CVAP data.

<sup>32</sup> See Table 1A in Appendix A to this Report.

<sup>33</sup> Report of Sean Trende at 13, 19.

<sup>34</sup> See Table 1B in Appendix A.

<sup>35</sup> Report of Sean Trende at 6.

<sup>36</sup> The Reock and Polsby-Popper scores are the two most commonly used compactness metrics.

superior on one of the two compactness measures, namely the Reock measure. According to Dr. Trende, “The Enacted Map’s District 13 has a Reock compactness score of 0.417 and a Polsby-Popper compactness score of 0.205.”<sup>37</sup> Dr. Trende’s Demonstration District A has a Reock compactness score of 0.412 and a Polsby-Popper score of 0.223.<sup>38</sup> Dr. Trende’s Demonstration District B has scores of 0.408 and 0.230, respectively.<sup>39</sup> Dr. Trende’s Demonstration District C has scores of 0.411 and 0.242, respectively.<sup>40</sup> Thus the two compactness measures actually point in opposite directions in the compactness comparison between the Prop 50 CD 13 and Dr. Trende’s comparison maps. Moreover, the differences in compactness shown above are trivial. And Dr. Trende’s attempt to dismiss the compactness of Prop 50 CD 13 completely misses the fact that CD 13 is one of the most compact districts in the Prop 50 map.<sup>41</sup> The Prop 50 CD 13’s Reock score puts the Prop 50 version of CD 13 among the top ten most compact districts in that map, out of the 52 districts.<sup>42</sup> The Polsby-Popper score puts the Prop 50 CD 13 among the top 15 districts in compactness in the Prop 50 map.<sup>43</sup>

(14) **CD 13 (continued).** To understand the configuration of CD 13, we must recognize that it touches other districts, which put constraints on how it could be configured. For example, directly north of CD 13 is a Democratic incumbent in the City of Tracy in CD 9. That puts limits on drawing a compact district to the north of Prop 50 CD 13.

(15) **CD 13 (continued).** Dr. Trende’s discussion of CD 13 also misses another potentially important point about the relevant politics. Dr. Trende calls attention to the inclusion of the city of Ceres in the Prop 50 map’s CD 13—a city which he correctly notes has a high Hispanic CVAP. Dr. Trende uses the 2024 Presidential election results to characterize the city as “Republican territory.” But in the other two elections used in his analysis, the 2024 U.S. Senate

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See Richard G. Niemi, Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci & Thomas Hofeller, *Measuring compactness and the role of a compactness standard in a test for partisan and racial gerrymandering*, 52 J. Pol. 1155 (1991). The Reock score compares the area of a district to the area of a circle that has the same perimeter as that district, providing a numerical value between 0 and 1. A score closer to 1 indicates a more compact shape, while a lower score suggests irregular or elongated shapes that suggest the map was drawn for political gain. The Polsby-Popper score is calculated as the ratio of the area of a district to the area of a circle whose circumference matches the district’s perimeter. This score also ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating a perfectly round district and 0 representing the least compact shape possible.

<sup>37</sup> Report of Sean P. Trende, Ph.D. Section on Demonstration Maps, pp. 38-42.

<sup>38</sup> *Id.*

<sup>39</sup> *Id.*

<sup>40</sup> *Id.*

<sup>41</sup> And, in any case, whatever the Prop 50 CD13’s compactness score, I am aware of no requirement to create the most compact district possible. Compactness is not listed as a requirement in the present California State Constitution, nor is it a federal statutory requirement for congressional districts.

<sup>42</sup> Compactness data is taken from Dave’s Redistricting App, a mapping program also used by Dr. Trende.

<sup>43</sup> Compactness data is taken from Dave’s Redistricting App.



election and the 2018 gubernatorial election,<sup>44</sup> Democratic candidates won the city with 51.8% and 60.0% of the vote, respectively. The city had also consistently voted for Adam Gray in all seven general elections in which he had appeared on the ballot as a member of the General Assembly from District 21. A partisan map drawer could consider the city's historic Democratic lean as well as Gray's history of receiving strong support from the voters in the city and conclude that it would be to the Democrats' partisan advantage to keep Ceres in CD 13.

(16) **CD 9, CD 5, CD 13.** Dr. Trende links the configuration of CD 13 to that of CD 9 and CD 5 (districts to which CD 13 is contiguous) in his argument that CD 13 has been drawn with a race preponderant motive<sup>45</sup> But actually, like CD 13, CD 5 and CD 9, as judged by effects, are both drawn with partisanship as the preponderant motive. Both are part of the Democrats' partisan gerrymandering efforts. CD 9 is a competitive seat that is "shored up" in terms of Democratic vote; CD 5 is a Republican district which was further "packed" with Republican votes, thus wasting those Republican votes.

(17) **CD 9.** CD 9 reflects one of the central goals of an efficient partisan gerrymander, namely a desire to strengthen Democratic incumbents in competitive districts. The Democratic incumbent in CD 9, Representative Josh Harder, won his 2024 election with only 51.8% of the vote, while President Donald Trump carried his district with 49.4% to Kamala Harris's 47.6%. CD 9 is listed as among the vulnerable Democratic seats in Appendix A, Table 1B.

(18) **CD 5.** CD 5 reflects another key aspect of an effective partisan gerrymandering. Based on effects, CD5 in the Prop 50 map makes use of one of the key tools of partisan gerrymandering, namely "packing." Republicans are added to a district that is already safe for Republicans. It is not drawn with race as a preponderant motive. Using 2023 CVAP data, the Hispanic CVAP share of CD 9 actually goes down from the CRC map to the Prop 50 map, while in contrast, the Democratic share goes up by 6 percentage points in the Prop 50 map's CD 9, compared to the CRC map.<sup>46</sup>

## 2. The Centeno and Cuellar Report

(19) While the Centeno and Cuellar Report contains a number of observations about Hispanic demographics and election preferences in California that are well known to students of Hispanic politics in the state, and which I reference in my observations below, it at no point endorses the claim that race was the preponderant motive in the Prop 50 map.

(20) I wish to call attention to two methodological issues involving the Centeno and Cuellar Report.

(21) First, Table 4 of their report calculates a change in Hispanic CVAP using two different sets of CVAP data, rather than one. The third column in Table 4 of that report provides CVAP for 2023, and the fourth column purports to show the change in Hispanic CVAP between the

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<sup>44</sup> Expert Report of Sean P. Trende, Ph.D. Section on Demonstration Maps, pp. 38-42.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*

<sup>46</sup> See Table 1A in Appendix A.

CRC map and the Prop 50 map.<sup>47</sup> But the calculation in column 4 of Table 4 is not based on a consistent CVAP metric and is thus misleading. The comparison Centeno and Cuellar make in column 4 is based on the 2023 Hispanic CVAP used by the legislature for its Prop 50 calculations, and the 2019 Hispanic CVAP values used by the CRC for the map used in 2022. But, as Centeno and Cuellar themselves note, there continue to have been increases in Hispanic population since the CRC map was drawn.<sup>48</sup> Using these two different sets of data, their Table 4 shows the CVAP in CD 13 increasing by 3.6 percentage points between the CRC and Prop 50 maps. But the result of performing a comparison using only the 2023 CVAP values for both maps yields essentially no change and, indeed, a slight reduction of Hispanic CVAP in CD 13 from 54.0% in the CRC map to 53.8% in the Prop 50 map.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, if both maps are compared using only 2019 CVAP values, the result is that CD 13 has gone down in Hispanic CVAP from 50.2% in the CRC map to 49.5% in the Prop 50 map.<sup>50</sup> Accordingly, the data shown in Table 4 of their report are quite misleading.

(22) A second methodological issue with the Centeno and Cuellar report is how they define “influence districts.”<sup>51</sup> The concept of “influence” is a very murky one. From a political science standpoint, it is simply not true that any district below a majority minority population but above, say, a 30% CVAP for a given minority, should be characterized as giving that minority “political influence.” At minimum, we would need to know if the incumbent represented the views of a given group, in addition to the overall racial and partisan composition of the district in racial and partisan terms and the partisanship of the incumbents. The present world is hyper-polarized along party lines, and one must carefully evaluate the potential nature of the political influence a given minority group has with a particular incumbent.<sup>52</sup>

### 3. Brief Discussion of Hispanic Demographics and Electoral Politics in California

(23) There are a number of key demographic and political facts about the Hispanic population in California that help explain how substantial changes in district lines are very likely to involve changes in the Hispanic population in the changed districts.<sup>53</sup> First, Hispanics are the largest single racial or ethnic group in California in terms of population (roughly 40%, according to the 2021 Census), and population is the basis of redistricting. Moreover, Hispanics are a very

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<sup>47</sup> Centeno and Cuellar, *Latino Voters and the November 2025 Special Election: Redistricting and Representation* (“Centeno and Cuellar Report”), <https://www.cpp.edu/class/political-science/docs/media/proposition-50.pdf> 9 (last visited Dec. 1, 2025).

<sup>48</sup> *Id.* at 4.

<sup>49</sup> See Table 2A in Appendix A to this Report.

<sup>50</sup> See Table 2B in Appendix A to this Report.

<sup>51</sup> See Centeno and Cuellar Report at 6.

<sup>52</sup> See e.g., Merrill, Samuel, Bernard Grofman, and Thomas Brunell. 2023. *How Polarization Begets Polarization: Ideological Extremism in the U.S. Congress*. Oxford University Press.

<sup>53</sup> Centeno and Cuellar Report at 9.

substantial portion (nearly 30%) of the state's registered voters.<sup>54</sup> Second, Hispanic voters are solidly Democratic in registration and voting patterns.<sup>55</sup> Third, the Hispanic population and electorate is growing while the overall population of the state is relatively stagnant.<sup>56</sup> Fourth, there are areas of the state which are highly Democratic, but not Hispanic majority, where Hispanic and White and possibly other minor communities will be commingled. In general, Republican areas will have a lower proportion of Hispanics than Democratic areas, because Hispanics are less likely to be Republican than Whites. Thus, seeking to add Democrats to a district, especially in conjunction with removing Republicans from a district, may well increase the Hispanic proportion in the district as an incidental effect of seeking partisan gain.

#### 4. Brief Discussion Regarding Evidence of Intent of Partisan Gerrymandering

(24) The Prop 50 map will have effects that may determine which political party will control the U.S. House of Representatives in 2026, and thus the incentives for partisan gerrymandering in the Prop 50 map were extraordinarily high.

(25) The votes for placing the referendum on the ballots and for the adoption of the map were basically straight party-line voting. The roll call vote on the map adoption in the legislature divided almost purely on party lines. Fifty-six of 60 Democrats in the Assembly voted “yes,” in contrast to all 19 Republicans in the Assembly voting “no.”<sup>57</sup> Even more strikingly, all 30 Democrats in the State Senate voted “yes” on placing the referendum on the ballot, in contrast to none of the 10 Republicans in the State Senate voting “yes.”<sup>58</sup>

(26) Because this case involves a vote to place a redistricting referendum on the ballot, there is also evidence relevant to the underlying motivation for the map that would not ordinarily be found in other cases where there is a claim for a racially predominant motivation to the map drawing. If we look at the amount of money spent on campaigning on Prop 50 by groups favoring a “yes” vote, for example, virtually all of it comes from political groups affiliated with the Democratic party. The largest contributors were committees affiliated with the Democratic

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<sup>54</sup> Nearly one of every three (29.6%) California registered voters are Latino. NALEO Report at 17.

<sup>55</sup> In California, 53.5% of Latinos affiliate with the Democratic Party and only one of every six Latino registered voters (16.7%) is registered as Republican, with roughly 30% unaffiliated with either party. NALEO, *California's Fast-Growing Latino Electorate: An Election 2024 Portrait* (“NALEO Report”), [https://naleo.org/COMMS/PRA/2024/CA\\_Latino\\_Eligible\\_Electorate\\_Portrait\\_-\\_Final.pdf](https://naleo.org/COMMS/PRA/2024/CA_Latino_Eligible_Electorate_Portrait_-_Final.pdf) (last visited Dec. 1, 2025). NALEO is the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials

<sup>56</sup> “Between 2012 and 2022, California's electorate grew from 23.8 million to 26.1 million. The increase in the Latino eligible electorate—from 6.4 million to 8.5 million—accounted for 92.3% of the state's electorate growth.” NALEO Report at 7.

<sup>57</sup> *AB-604 Redistricting: congressional districts (2025-2026): Votes*, Cal. Legis. Info., [https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill\\_id=202520260AB604](https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billVotesClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB604) (last visited Dec. 3, 2025).

<sup>58</sup> *Id.*



Party or Democratic officials, labor unions and a handful of individuals.<sup>59</sup> Almost none of the campaign spending on Prop 50 came from groups that directly lobby for or provide legal services to racial or ethnic groups.<sup>60</sup> On the other side, the leader of the No on Prop 50 movement was directly identified with the Republican party.<sup>61</sup>

(27) Public messaging to voters was that the referendum was partisan in nature. For example, the ballot label described the referendum as a “response to Texas’s partisan redistricting,”<sup>62</sup> In contrast, there are no statements referring to race or ethnicity in the “Official Voter Information Guide” for the Prop 50 referendum. That guide is distributed to all California voters. The Legislative Analyst’s Office’s analysis of the ballot measure also described the referendum as a “response to Texas’s partisan redistricting.” And it also contained no references as to race or ethnicity.<sup>63</sup>

### C. Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Voting Rights Act § 2 Claim

(28) My Report does not include analysis on this topic because Plaintiff-Intervenors’ filings include no relevant facts.

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<sup>59</sup> See Ballotpedia, *California Proposition 50, Use of Legislative Congressional Redistricting Map Amendment (2025)*, [https://ballotpedia.org/California\\_Proposition\\_50\\_Use\\_of\\_Legislative\\_Congressional\\_Redistricting\\_Map\\_Amendment\\_\(2025\)](https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_50_Use_of_Legislative_Congressional_Redistricting_Map_Amendment_(2025)) (last visited Dec. 1, 2025).

<sup>60</sup> *Id.*

<sup>61</sup> [Jessica Millan Patterson](#), former chairperson of the [California Republican Party](#), was listed as the principal officer of No on Prop 50 - Stop Sacramento's Power Grab. *Id.*

<sup>62</sup> California Secretary of State, *Proposition 50 Ballot Label*, <https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/statewide-elections/public-display/prop-50-ballot-label.pdf> (last visited Dec. 3, 2025).

<sup>63</sup> Legislative Analyst’s Office, *Proposition 50*, <https://lao.ca.gov/BallotAnalysis/Proposition?number=50&year=2025> (last visited Dec. 3, 2025). The Ballot Label in the California Voter Information Guide and the Legislative Analyst’s Office characterization of the Prop 50 ballot are identical.

# APPENDIX A

**Table 1A.** Changes in 2023 Adjusted Hispanic CVAP and 2024 Presidential Vote Share in Republican-Held Congressional Districts

| CD | 2023<br>Hispanic<br>CVAP -<br>in CRC<br>Districts | 2023<br>Hispanic<br>CVAP - in<br>Prop 50<br>Districts | Major Party Vote<br>Share in 2024<br>Presidential<br>Election in CRC<br>Districts |       | Major Party Vote<br>Share in 2024<br>Presidential<br>Election in Prop 50<br>Districts |       |
|----|---|---|---|-------|---|-------|
|    |   |   | Dem   | Rep   | Dem   | Rep   |
| 1  | 16.6%   | 18.4%   | 36.1%   | 61.1% | 54.5%   | 42.3% |
| 3  | 11.6%   | 14.5%   | 46.5%   | 50.3% | 53.4%   | 43.2% |
| 5  | 21.0%   | 23.7%   | 39.9%   | 57.6% | 38.4%   | 59.1% |
| 20 | 28.7%   | 31.8%   | 33.7%   | 64.0% | 32.8%   | 65.0% |
| 22 | 64.3%   | 65.4%   | 45.8%   | 51.6% | 47.8%   | 49.6% |
| 23 | 36.1%   | 37.0%   | 40.3%   | 57.1% | 39.0%   | 58.4% |
| 40 | 20.4%   | 28.0%   | 47.2%   | 49.5% | 42.4%   | 54.6% |
| 41 | 33.3%   | 55.0%   | 45.7%   | 51.6% | 55.5%   | 41.4% |
| 48 | 23.9%   | 32.0%   | 41.1%   | 56.4% | 50.4%   | 47.0% |

**Table 1B.** Changes in 2023 Adjusted Hispanic CVAP and 2024 Presidential Vote Share in Democrat-Held Congressional Districts

| CD   | 2023<br>Hispanic<br>CVAP -<br>in CRC<br>Districts | 2023<br>Hispanic<br>CVAP - in<br>Prop 50<br>Districts | Major Party Vote<br>Share in 2024<br>Presidential<br>Election in CRC<br>Districts |       | Major Party Vote<br>Share in 2024<br>Presidential<br>Election in Prop 50<br>Districts |       |
|--|---|---|---|-------|---|-------|
|  |   |   | Dem   | Rep   | Dem   | Rep   |
| 9  | 33.3%   | 31.0%   | 47.6%   | 49.4% | 54.1%   | 42.7% |
| 13   | 54.0%   | 53.8%   | 46.0%   | 51.3% | 48.9%   | 48.4% |
| 21   | 56.1%   | 54.4%   | 50.6%   | 46.8% | 51.7%   | 45.7% |
| 25   | 56.5%   | 52.1%   | 50.1%   | 47.6% | 51.8%   | 46.0% |
| 27   | 37.0%   | 39.5%   | 50.5%   | 46.6% | 53.4%   | 43.6% |
| 45   | 24.6%   | 28.3%   | 49.3%   | 47.8% | 50.5%   | 46.6% |
| 47   | 14.7%   | 15.3%   | 50.3%   | 46.2% | 53.2%   | 43.1% |
| 49   | 21.7%   | 18.4%   | 52.5%   | 44.7% | 54.6%   | 42.5% |
| All Other<br>Dem-Held<br>Districts<br>(n=35) (avg) | 33.3%   | 31.9%   | 64.9%   | 31.7% | 63.1%   | 33.5% |

**Table 2A.** 2023 Adjusted Hispanic CVAP and 2024 Presidential Vote share in Hispanic CVAP Districts

| CD | 2023<br>Hispanic<br>CVAP -<br>in CRC<br>Districts | 2023<br>Hispanic<br>CVAP - in<br>Prop 50<br>Districts | Major Party Vote<br>Shares in 2024<br>Presidential<br>Election in CRC<br>Districts |       | Major Party Vote<br>Shares in 2024<br>Presidential Election in<br>Prop 50 Districts |       |
|----|---|---|--|-------|---|-------|
|    |   |   | Dem  | Rep   | Dem   | Rep   |
| 13 | 54.0%   | 53.8%   | 46.0%  | 51.3% | 48.9%   | 48.4% |
| 18 | 52.8%   | 53.0%   | 63.2%  | 33.7% | 62.7%   | 34.2% |
| 21 | 56.1%   | 54.4%   | 50.6%  | 46.8% | 51.7%   | 45.7% |
| 22 | 64.3%   | 65.4%   | 45.8%  | 51.6% | 47.8%   | 49.6% |
| 25 | 56.5%   | 52.1%   | 50.1%  | 47.6% | 51.8%   | 46.0% |
| 29 | 55.4%   | 53.6%   | 65.8%  | 31.0% | 65.3%   | 31.6% |
| 31 | 55.3%   | 52.2%   | 56.9%  | 40.0% | 54.6%   | 42.4% |
| 33 | 55.8%   | 54.5%   | 52.9%  | 44.2% | 53.5%   | 43.6% |
| 34 | 54.9%   | 54.9%   | 73.1%  | 22.4% | 73.1%   | 22.4% |
| 35 | 58.7%   | 53.1%   | 53.7%  | 43.4% | 52.4%   | 44.6% |
| 38 | 56.5%   | 52.6%   | 56.5%  | 40.4% | 54.5%   | 42.2% |
| 39 | 54.2%   | 54.3%   | 53.3%  | 43.6% | 53.2%   | 43.7% |
| 41 | 33.3%   | 55.0%   | 45.7%  | 51.6% | 55.5%   | 41.4% |
| 42 | 55.1%   | 24.6%   | 64.5%  | 32.0% | 55.0%   | 41.9% |
| 44 | 52.7%   | 62.4%   | 52.7%  | 31.5% | 66.0%   | 30.8% |
| 46 | 54.3%   | 52.7%   | 57.3%  | 39.6% | 56.5%   | 40.3% |
| 52 | 52.1%   | 51.8%   | 59.3%  | 38.1% | 57.5%   | 39.9% |

**Table 2B.** 2019 Adjusted Hispanic CVAP and 2024 Presidential Vote share in Hispanic CVAP Districts

| CD | 2019<br>Hispanic<br>CVAP -<br>in CRC<br>Districts | 2019<br>Hispanic<br>CVAP - in<br>Prop 50<br>Districts | Major Party Vote<br>Shares in 2024<br>Presidential<br>Election in CRC<br>Districts |       | Major Party Vote<br>Shares in 2024<br>Presidential Election in<br>2024 Districts |       |
|----|---|---|--|-------|--|-------|
|    |   |   | Dem  | Rep   | Dem  | Rep   |
| 13 | 50.2%   | 49.5%   | 46.0%  | 51.3% | 48.9%  | 48.4% |
| 18 | 50.5%   | 50.4%   | 63.2%  | 33.7% | 62.7%  | 34.2% |
| 21 | 53.3%   | 51.5%   | 50.6%  | 46.8% | 51.7%  | 45.7% |
| 22 | 59.4%   | 60.7%   | 45.8%  | 51.6% | 47.8%  | 49.6% |
| 25 | 52.5%   | 48.3%   | 50.1%  | 47.6% | 51.8%  | 46.0% |
| 29 | 54.2%   | 52.6%   | 65.8%  | 31.0% | 65.3%  | 31.6% |
| 31 | 54.7%   | 50.2%   | 56.9%  | 40.0% | 54.6%  | 42.4% |
| 33 | 52.5%   | 51.4%   | 52.9%  | 44.2% | 53.5%  | 43.6% |
| 34 | 56.1%   | 56.1%   | 73.1%  | 22.4% | 73.1%  | 22.4% |
| 35 | 57.4%   | 51.6%   | 53.7%  | 43.4% | 52.4%  | 44.6% |
| 38 | 55.6%   | 52.9%   | 56.5%  | 40.4% | 54.5%  | 42.2% |
| 39 | 51.2%   | 51.1%   | 53.3%  | 43.6% | 53.2%  | 43.7% |
| 41 | 29.7%   | 52.9%   | 45.7%  | 51.6% | 55.5%  | 41.4% |
| 42 | 52.3%   | 22.3%   | 64.5%  | 32.0% | 55.0%  | 41.9% |
| 44 | 51.0%   | 60.8%   | 52.7%  | 31.5% | 66.0%  | 30.8% |
| 46 | 50.5%   | 48.8%   | 57.3%  | 39.6% | 56.5%  | 40.3% |
| 52 | 51.1%   | 51.3%   | 59.3%  | 38.1% | 57.5%  | 39.9% |

**Table 3A.** November 2025 Cook Political Report House Ratings of CRC Map and of Prop 50 Map in Republican-Held Congressional Districts<sup>1</sup>

| <b>CD</b> | <b>Nov. 2, 2025,<br/>Rating of CRC<br/>Districts</b> | <b>Nov. 4, 2025,<br/>Rating of Prop 50<br/>Districts</b> |
|-----------|--|--|
| 1         | Solid R  | Solid D  |
| 3         | Likely R   | Solid D  |
| 5         | Solid R  | Solid R  |
| 20        | Solid R  | Solid R  |
| 22        | Lean R   | Toss Up  |
| 23        | Solid R  | Solid R  |
| 40        | Lean R   | Solid R  |
| 41        | Lean R   | Solid D  |
| 48        | Solid R  | Toss Up  |

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<sup>1</sup> *Compare 2026 CPR House Race Ratings*, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/557146>, with *2026 CPR House Race Ratings*, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/558166>; *see also*, Erin Covey, *California's Newly Passed Map Spurs 11 Ratings Changes*, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/analysis/house/redistricting/californias-newly-passed-map-spurs-11-ratings-changes> (describing changes in the Cook Political Report's ratings—"all but one shifting in Democrats' direction"—in the wake of California Voters approving Prop 50).

**Table 3B.** November 2025 Cook Political Report House Ratings of CRC Map and of Prop 50 Map in Democrat-Held Congressional Districts<sup>2</sup>

| <b>CD</b>                    | <b>Nov. 2, 2025,<br/>Rating of 2022<br/>Districts</b> | <b>Nov. 4, 2025,<br/>Rating of Prop 50<br/>Districts</b> |
|------------------------------|---|--|
| 9                            | Lean D  | Solid D  |
| 13                           | Toss Up   | Toss Up  |
| 21                           | Likely D  | Likely D   |
| 25                           | Likely D  | Likely D   |
| 27                           | Lean D  | Solid D  |
| 45                           | Toss Up   | Lean D   |
| 47                           | Lean D  | Likely D   |
| 49                           | Likely D  | Solid D  |
| All other Dem-held districts | Solid Dem   | Solid Dem  |

<sup>2</sup> Compare 2026 CPR House Race Ratings, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/557146>, with 2026 CPR House Race Ratings, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/ratings/house-race-ratings/558166>; see also, Erin Covey, *California's Newly Passed Map Spurs 11 Ratings Changes*, Cook Political Report with Amy Walter (Nov. 4, 2025), <https://www.cookpolitical.com/analysis/house/redistricting/californias-newly-passed-map-spurs-11-ratings-changes> (describing changes in the Cook Political Report's ratings—"all but one shifting in Democrats' direction"—in the wake of California Voters approving Prop 50).



# APPENDIX B

**BERNARD NORMAN GROFMAN****SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**

UC Irvine

[www.socsci.uci.edu/~bgrofman](http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bgrofman)[bgtravel@uci.edu](mailto:bgtravel@uci.edu)**VITA**

BERNARD N. GROFMAN, Distinguished Research Professor (Emeritus), University of California, Irvine

**EDUCATION**

B.S. University of Chicago, Mathematics (1966)  
M.A. University of Chicago, Political Science (1968)  
Ph.D. University of Chicago, Political Science (1972)

**HONORARY DEGREES**

2010 Honorary Doctorate in Political Science (*Doctor scientiarum politicarum honoris causa*), University of Copenhagen

**MOST RECENT ACADEMIC POSITIONS HELD**

2015- 22 Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine  
2008-22 Jack W. Peltason (Bren Foundation) Endowed Chair, University of California, Irvine  
2001-22 Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of California, Irvine  
2023- Distinguished Research (Emeritus) Professor of Political Science, University of California, Irvine

**FORMER ACADEMIC POSITIONS**

1970-71 Instructor, Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook.  
1971-76 Assistant Professor, Political Science, SUNY at Stony Brook  
1976-80 Associate Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, University of California, Irvine  
1980- Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, University of California, Irvine.  
2008-12 Director, Center for the Study of Democracy, UCI Interdisciplinary Organized Research Unit

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

American Political Science Association  
Public Choice Society  
Law and Society Association  
American Institute of Parliamentarians

VISITING POSITIONS AND FELLOWSHIPS

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| 1973    | Visiting Lecturer (Gastdozent), Department of Political Science (Lehrstuhl für Politische Wissenschaft), University of Mannheim (Summer Semester).   |
| 1975    | Adjunct Assistant Professor, Applied Mathematics, SUNY at Stony Brook (Spring Semester).   |
| 1975-76 | Visiting Assistant Professor, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine (Winter and Spring Quarters).                              |
| 1984    | Guest Scholar (Sabbatical), Governmental Studies Program, Brookings Institution (Winter Quarter).  |
| 1985    | College Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Washington, Seattle (Spring Quarter).                                     |
| 1985-86 | Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford   |
| 1989    | Visiting Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan (Fall Semester).   |
| 1990    | Scholar-in-Residence, Institute for Legal Studies, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan (June-July)   |
| 1992    | Landsdowne Visiting Scholar, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, Canada (one week)  |
| 2001    | Fellow, University Institute of Advanced Study and Scholar-in-Residence, University of Bologna, Italy (May-June)                                     |
| 2002    | Scholar-in-Residence, Berlin Science Center (Wissenschaft Zentrum) Germany (July)  |
| 2003    | Gaspar de Portola Scholar-in-Residence, Department of Economics, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona (May-June)                                       |
| 2006    | Scholar-in-Residence, New York University School of Law (Sept.-Dec.)   |
| 2007    | Scholar-in-Residence, Institute for Research on Government and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris II (Pantheon), France (April-June) |
| 2008    | Scholar-in-Residence, Institute for Research on Government and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris II (Pantheon), France (April-May)  |
| 2008    | Official Politics Visitor, Scholar-in Residence, Nuffield College, Oxford University (June)  |
| 2009    | Scholar-in-Residence, Institute for Research on Government and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris II (Pantheon), France (June-July)  |
| 2010    | Scholar-in-Residence, New York University School of Law (Sept.-Dec.)   |

VISITING POSITIONS AND FELLOWSHIPS (cont.)

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| 2012-13 | Straus Research Fellow, Straus Institute for the Advanced Study of Law and Justice, New York University School of Law (academic year 2012-13) |
| 2013    | Official Politics Visitor, Scholar in Residence, Nuffield College, Oxford University (September)  |
| 2014    | Visiting Collaborative Scholar, Dept. of Economics, Complutense University, Madrid (one week, April)  |
| 2014    | Visiting Professor, Dept. of Economics, University of Caen, France (May)  |
| 2015    | Visiting Scholar, Dept. of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Vienna (two weeks, April)   |
| 2015    | Visiting Scholar, Dept. of Political Science, University of Konstanz, Germany (two weeks, June)   |
| 2016    | Visiting Scholar, Dept. of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary (two weeks, April)                               |
| 2016    | Official Politics Visitor, Scholar-in-Residence, Nuffield College, Oxford University (June -September)  |
| 2017    | Visiting Scholar, Juan March Institute, University of Carlos III, Madrid (one week, March)  |
| 2018    | Visiting Scholar-in-Residence, Nuffield College, Oxford University (two weeks, September)   |
| 2019    | Official Politics Visitor, Scholar-in-Residence, Nuffield College, Oxford University (two weeks, September)                                   |
| 2024    | Scholar-in-Residence, University of Auckland, New Zealand (one week, February)  |
| 2024    | Scholar-in-Residence, Australian National University, Canberra (one week, March)  |
| 2024    | Scholar-in-Residence, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand (one week, March)  |

BOOKS AND EDITED BOOKSBOOKS (published)

- (P1) Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi. Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- (P2) Merrill, Samuel III and Bernard Grofman. A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- (P3) Adams, James, Samuel Merrill and Bernard Grofman. 2005. A Unified Theory of Party Competition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- (P4) Regenwetter, Michael, Bernard Grofman, A. A. J. Marley and Ilia Tsetlin. 2006. Behavioral Social Choice: Probabilistic Models, Statistical Inference, and Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- (P5) Taylor, Steven, Matthew Shugart, Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman. 2014. A Different Democracy: American Government in Thirty-One Country Perspective New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- (P6) Merrill, Samuel, Bernard Grofman, and Thomas Brunell. 2024. How Polarization Begets Polarization: Ideological Extremism in the U.S. Congress. New York and Oxford. Oxford University Press.
- (P7) Grofman, Bernard. 2025. Introduction to Laws of Statistical Sampling. Sage Publications.

EDITED BOOKS (published)

- (E1) Grofman, Bernard N., Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow (Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982. (initially published as a 1981 special issue of Policy Studies Journal, 9(3))
- (E2) Lijphart, Arend and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Choosing an Electoral System. New York: Praeger, 1984. (2001 co-recipient of the George Hallett Prize of the Representation and Electoral Systems Section of the American Political Science Association for books with a lasting contribution to the study of electoral systems.)
- (E3) Grofman, Bernard N. and Arend Lijphart (Eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986. (2001 co-recipient of the George Hallett Prize of the Representation and Electoral Systems Section of the American Political Science Association for books with a lasting contribution to the study of electoral systems.)

EDITED BOOKS (published) (cont.)

- (E4) Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen (Eds.), Information Pooling and Group Decision Making. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1986.
- (E5) Grofman, Bernard N. and Donald Wittman (Eds.), The “Federalist Papers” and the New Institutionalism. New York: Agathon Press, 1989.
- (E6) Grofman, Bernard N. (Ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. New York: Agathon Press, 1990.
- (E7) Grofman, Bernard and Chandler Davidson (Eds.), Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992. (Designated by the Gustavus Myers Center for the Study of Human Rights in North America as one of the outstanding books published in 1992 on intolerance.)
- (E8) Grofman, Bernard N. (Ed.), Information, Participation and Choice: An ‘Economic Theory of Democracy’ in Perspective. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1993.
- (E9) Davidson, Chandler and Bernard Grofman (Eds.), Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. (Richard Fenno Prize of the Legislative Studies Section of the American Political Science Association for the best book published in 1994 in the field of legislative studies.)
- (E10) Grofman, Bernard (Ed.) Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives. Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1996.
- (E11) Grofman, Bernard (Ed.) Race and Redistricting in the 1990s. New York: Agathon Press, 1998.
- (E12) Grofman, Bernard, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Eds.) Elections in Japan, Korea and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- (E13) Grofman, Bernard (Ed.) Legacies of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000.
- (E14) Bowler, Shaun and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000
- (E15) Grofman, Bernard (Ed.). Political Science as Puzzle Solving. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
- (E16) Grofman, Bernard and Arend Lijphart (Eds.) The Evolution of Electoral and Party Systems in the Nordic Countries. New York: Agathon Press, 2002.

EDITED BOOKS (published) (cont.)

- (E17) Handley, Lisa and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) Redistricting in Comparative Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- (E18) Grofman, Bernard, Shaun Bowler, and Andre Blais (Eds.) Duverger's Law in Canada, India, the U.S. and the U.K. New York: Springer, 2008.
- (E19) Sigelman, Lee, Kenneth Newton, Kenneth J. Meier, and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) The Wit and Humor of Political Science. American Political Science Association and European Consortium for Political Research, 2010.
- (E20) Giannetti, Daniela and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform: Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan. New York: Springer, 2011.
- (E21) Dolez, Bernard, Bernard Grofman and Annie Laurent (Eds.) In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform: French Presidential Elections. New York: Springer, 2011.
- (E22) Bernard Grofman, Alex Trechsel and Mark Franklin (Eds.) The Internet and Democracy: Voters, Parties, Interest Groups, and Social Movements. New York: Springer, 2013.
- (E23) Alvarez, Michael and Bernard Grofman (Eds.) Election Administration in the United States: The State of Reform after *Bush v. Gore*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
- (E24) Congleton, Roger, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume I. Oxford University Press, 2018.
- (E25) Congleton, Roger, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume II. Oxford University Press, 2018.
- (E26) Suhay, Elizabeth, Bernard Grofman, and Alex Trechsel (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion. Oxford University Press, 2020.

EDITED JOURNAL SYMPOSIA and MINISYMPOSIA

- (J1) 1981. Minisymposium on Voter Turnout. American Politics Quarterly, 9(2).
- (J2) 1993. Minisymposium on the 2500th Anniversary of Democracy. PS: Political Science, (September).
- (J3) 2005. Symposium on Elections under the French Double Ballot System, co-edited with Michael Lewis-Beck. French Politics 3
- (J4) 2005. Symposium on Political Culture, Representation and Electoral Systems in the Pacific Islands, co-edited with Jon Fraenkel, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies 43.
- (J5) 2008. Minisymposium on Runoff Methods, co-edited with Andre Blais and Shaun Bowler. Electoral Studies 27.
- (J6) 2012. Minisymposium (in French) on The Legacy of Maurice Duverger, co-edited with Bernard Dolez and Annie Laurent. Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée,

MAJOR RESEARCH GRANTS

- 2011-12 Monitoring the Nature and Impact of Public Input into the Legislative and Congressional Redistricting Process (Sloan Foundation, \$119,756, PI).
- 2007-09 Political Competition. Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, (SSHRCC #410-2007-2153, \$87,290: Associate Investigator: co-PIs, Stanley Winer and J. Stephen Ferris).
- 1998-01 Collaborative Research on Probabilistic Models of Social Choice. National Science Foundation Program in Methodology Measurement and Statistics, (NSF# SBR-97-30578, \$213,000 with Anthony Marley, Co-PI).
- 1994-95 Electoral Laws, Electoral Lists and Campaigning in the First Non-Racial South African General Election, National Science Foundation, National Science Foundation (NSF# SBR-93- 21864, \$39,512, co-PI with Arend Lijphart).
- 1991-93 The Impact of Redistricting on the Representation of Racial and Ethnic Minorities, The Ford Foundation (#446740-47007, \$166,000).
- 1988-92 Collaborative Research on the Voting Rights Act: Implementation, Effects, and Implications for Law and Society. National Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES #88-09392, \$231,000, co-PI with Chandler Davidson); Supplementary Grant for Collaborative Research on the Voting Rights Act: The Effects of Changing Electoral Systems on the Election of Women. National Science Foundation Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES 88-09392, \$8,500, with Chandler Davidson and Susan Welch).



MAJOR RESEARCH GRANTS (cont.)

- 1987 Ethnic Voting Patterns in Metropolitan Toronto (Social Sciences Humanities Research Council of Canada, \$14,480, with Janet Landa and Michael Copeland.
- 1985-87 The Dynamics of Spatial Voting Games and Games on Graphs, National Science Foundation, Decision and Management Sciences Program (NSF SES #85-06376, \$99,300, with Guillermo Owen).
- 1985-86 The Impact of Laws Relating to Elections and Representation, National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF SES #85-15468, \$23,200).
- 1983-84 Analysis of the Multnomah Jury Archive, National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SES #82-18588, \$35,000).
- 1981-83 Reapportionment and Representation. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 81-07554, \$49,970 with Guillermo Owen)
- 1980-82 Applications of Game Theory to the Study of Political Institutions. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 80-07915, \$31,300 with Guillermo Owen)
- 1978-79 Modeling Jury Decision Processes: The Multnomah Jury Archive, National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SOC 77-24702, \$73,800). \$8,000 funding provided by the American Bar Association).
- 1978-79 Electoral System: What Difference Does it Make? National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF SOC 77-24474, \$35,800, with Howard Scarrow).
- 1976-77 Modeling Jury Decision Processes, National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program (NSF SOC 75-14091, \$68,200).

PROFESSIONAL HONORS AND AWARDS

- 2017 Recipient, Charles Merriam Award of the American Political Science Association for lifetime achievement in the field of applied public Policy (awarded biennially)
- 2001- Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences
- 2000-02 President, Public Choice Society
- 1991-93 Chair, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association.
- 1982-85 Co-Chair, Conference Group on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RESEARCH AND TEACHING HONORS AND AWARDS

- 2005 University of California, Irvine Academic Senate Distinguished Faculty Award for Research
- 2001 Lauds and Laurels Award for Faculty Achievement, UCI Alumni Association.
- 1997 The campus-wide winner, Award for Teaching Innovation and Excellence: UCI Dean for Undergraduate Education.
- 1996 The School of Social Sciences winner, Award for Teaching Innovation and Excellence: UCI Dean for Undergraduate Education.
- 1995 Lauds and Laurels Award for Professional Achievement, UCI Alumni Association

CONFERENCE PAPER AWARDS

- 2003 Co-recipient (with Timothy Brazill) of the Duncan Black Prize of the Public Choice Society for best paper published in Public Choice in 2002, (“Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court through Multi-Dimensional Scaling: Analysis of the ‘Natural Courts’ 1953-1991”)
- 1985 Co-recipient (with Philip Straffin) of the Carl B. Allendoerfer Award, Mathematical Association of America, for exposition in mathematical Writing for undergraduates (Best paper, Mathematics Magazine).
- 1979 Pi Sigma Alpha Award, Best Paper, Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

LISTINGS

Who's Who in the World. Providence, NJ: Marquis, various yearly editions beginning in 1998.

American Political Scientists: A Dictionary. Glenn H. Utter and Charles Lockhart (Eds.) Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002, pp. 138-140.

Directory of American Scholars, 10<sup>th</sup> ed. Gale Group, 2002.

Rowley, Charles K. and Friedrich Schneider. Encyclopedia of Public Choice. Vol. 1. 2004. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London. Grofman Biography, pp. 355-356

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print)

- (1) Grofman, Bernard N., and Edward Muller. 1973. The strange case of relative gratification and potential for political violence: The V-curve. American Political Science Review, 67:514-539.
- (2) Grofman, Bernard N., and Gerald Hyman. 1973. Probability and logic in belief systems. Theory and Decision, 4:179-195.
- (3) Grofman, Bernard N. 1974. Helping behavior and group size, some exploratory stochastic models. Behavioral Science, 19:219-224.
- (4) Grofman, Bernard N., and Gerald Hyman. 1974. The logical foundations of ideology. Behavioral Science, 19:225-237.
- (5) Grofman, Bernard N. 1975. The prisoner's dilemma game: Paradox reconsidered. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, 1:101-119.
- (6) Mackelprang, A. J., Bernard N. Grofman, and N. Keith Thomas. Electoral change and stability: Some new perspectives. 1975. American Politics Quarterly, 3(3):315-339.
- (7) Grofman, Bernard N. 1975. A review of macro-election systems. In Rudolph Wildenmann (Ed.), German Political Yearbook (Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch fur Politik), Vol. 4, Munich Germany: Gunter Olzog Verlag, 303-352.
- (8) Grofman, Bernard N., and Jonathan Pool. 1975. Bayesian models for iterated prisoner's dilemma games. General Systems, 20:185-194.
- (9) Grofman, Bernard N. 1976. Not necessarily twelve and not necessarily unanimous: Evaluating the impact of Williams v. Florida and Johnson v. Louisiana. In Gordon Bermant, Charlan Nemeth and Neil Vidmar (Eds.), Psychology and the Law: Research Frontiers. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 149-168.
- (10) Grofman, Bernard N. 1977. Jury decision-making models. In Stuart Nagel (Ed.), Modeling the Criminal Justice System, Sage Criminal Justice Systems Annuals, Vol. 7, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 191-203.
- (11) Grofman, Bernard N., and Jonathan Pool. 1977. How to make cooperation the optimizing strategy in a two-person game. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 5(2):173-186.
- (12) Grofman, Bernard N. 1978. Judgmental competence of individuals and groups in a dichotomous choice situation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 6(1):47-60.

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)

- (13) Grofman, Bernard N., and Howard Scarrow. 1979. *Iannucci* and its aftermath: The application of the Banzhaf Criterion to weighted voting in the State of New York. In Steven Brams, Andrew Schotter and Gerhard Schwodiauer (Eds.), Applied Game Theory. Vienna: Physica-Verlag, 168-183.
- (14) Grofman, Bernard N. 1980. A preliminary model of jury decision making. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Frontiers of Economics, Vol. 3, 98-110.
- (15) Grofman, Bernard N. 1980. Jury decision-making models and the Supreme Court: The jury cases from Williams v. Florida to Ballew v. Georgia. Policy Studies Journal, 8(5):749-772.
- (16) Grofman, Bernard N. 1980. The slippery slope: Jury size and jury verdict requirements--legal and social science approaches. Law and Politics Quarterly, 2(3):285-304.
- (17) Grofman, Bernard N., and Howard Scarrow. 1980. Mathematics, social science and the law. In Michael J. Saks and Charles H. Baron (Eds.), The Use/Nonuse/Misuse of Applied Social Research in the Courts. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, 117-127.
- (18) Grofman, Bernard N. 1981. Mathematical models of juror and jury decision making: the state of the art. In Bruce D. Sales (Ed.), Perspectives in Law and Psychology, Volume II: The Trial Processes. NY: Plenum, 305-351.
- (19) Grofman, Bernard N. 1981. The theory of committees and elections: The legacy of Duncan Black. In Gordon Tullock (Ed.), Toward a Science of Politics: Essays in Honor of Duncan Black. Blacksburg, VA: Public Choice Center, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 11-57.
- (20) Weisberg, Herbert and Bernard N. Grofman. 1981. Candidate evaluations and turnout. American Politics Quarterly, 9(2):197-219.
- (21) Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. 1981. Weighted voting in New York. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 6(2):287-304.
- (22) Grofman, Bernard N. 1981. Alternatives to single-member plurality districts: Legal and empirical issues. Policy Studies Journal, 9(3): 875-898. (Reprinted in Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay and Howard Scarrow (Eds.), Representation and Redistricting Issues. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1982, 107-128.
- (23) Taagepera, Rein and Bernard N. Grofman. 1981. Effective size and number of components. Sociological Methods and Research, 10:63-81.

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)

- (24) Landa, Janet, and Bernard N. Grofman. 1981. Games of breach and the role of contract law in protecting the expectation interest. Research in Law and Economics Annual, 3:67-90.
- (25) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. A dynamic model of proto-coalition formation in ideological n-space. Behavioral Science, 27:77-90.
- (26) Grofman, Bernard N., Scott L. Feld, and Guillermo Owen. 1982. Evaluating the competence of experts, pooling individual judgements into a collective choice, and delegating decision responsibility to subgroups. In Felix Geyer and Hans van der Zouwen (Eds.), Dependence and Inequality. NY: Pergamon Press, 221-238.
- (27) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. Reformers, politicians and the courts: A preliminary look at U.S. redistricting in the 1980s. Political Geography Quarterly, 1(4):303-316.
- (28) Grofman, Bernard N. and Howard Scarrow. 1982. Current issues in reapportionment. Law and Policy Quarterly, 4(4): 435-474.
- (29) Grofman, Bernard N. and Guillermo Owen. 1982. A game theoretic approach to measuring degree of centrality in social networks. Social Networks, 4:213-224.
- (30) Grofman, Bernard N., Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld. 1983. Thirteen theorems in search of the truth. Theory and Decision, 15:261-278.
- (31) Grofman, Bernard N. 1983. Measures of bias and proportionality in seats-votes relationships. Political Methodology, 9:295-327.
- (32) Grofman, Bernard N. and Janet Landa. 1983. The development of trading networks among spatially separated traders as a process of proto-coalition formation: the Kula trade. Social Networks, 5:347-365.
- (33) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. Coalitions and power in political situations. In Manfred Holler (Ed.), Coalitions and Collective Action. Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 137-143.
- (34) Grofman, Bernard N. 1984. The general irrelevance of the zero sum assumption in the legislative context. In Manfred Holler (Ed.), Coalitions and Collective Action. Wuerzburg: Physica-Verlag, 100-112.
- (35) Glazer, Amihai, Deborah Glazer, and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. Voting in corporate elections: Introducing strategy into the equations. South Carolina Law Review, 35(2):295-309.

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)

- (36) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. The accuracy of group majority decisions in groups with added members. Public Choice, 42: 273-285.
- (37) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvoting. Public Choice, 42:311-325.
- (38) Shapley, Lloyd S. and Bernard N. Grofman. 1984. Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies. Public Choice, 43(3):329-343.
- (39) Grofman, Bernard N., Michael Migalski, and Nicholas Noviello. 1985. The 'totality of circumstances' test in Section 2 of the 1982 extension of the Voting Rights Act: A social science perspective. Law and Policy, 7(2):209-223.
- (40) Grofman, Bernard N. Criteria for districting: A social science perspective. 1985. UCLA Law Review, 33(1):77-184.
- (41) Grofman, Bernard and Carole Uhlaner. 1985. Metapreferences and reasons for stability in social choice: Thoughts on broadening and clarifying the debate. Theory and Decision, 19:31-50.
- (42) Taagepera, Rein and Bernard Grofman. 1985. Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the effective number of parties in plurality and PR systems--parties minus issues equals one. European Journal of Political Research, 13:341-352. (Reprinted in J. Paul Johnston and Harvey E. Pasis (Eds.). Representation and Electoral Systems: Canadian Perspectives. Englewood City, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988.)
- (43) Niemi, Richard, Jeffrey Hill and Bernard Grofman. 1985. The impact of multimember districts on party representation in U.S. state legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 10(4):441-455.
- (44) Uhlaner, Carole and Bernard Grofman. 1986. The race may be close but my horse is going to win: Wish fulfillment in the 1980 Presidential election. Political Behavior, 8(2):101-129.
- (45) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1986. On the possibility of faithfully representative committees. American Political Science Review, 80(3):863-879.
- (46) Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley. 1987. Does redistricting aimed to help blacks necessarily help Republicans? Journal of Politics, 49:143-156. (Reprinted in Ann M. Bowman and R.C. Kearney, State and Local Government. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1990.)

PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)

- (47) Grofman, Bernard, Guillermo Owen, Nicholas Noviello and Amihai Glazer. 1987. Stability and centrality of legislative choice in the spatial context. American Political Science Review, 81(2):539-553.
- (48) Grofman, Bernard N. Models of voting. 1987. In Samuel Long (Ed.), Micropolitics Annual, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 31-61.
- (49) Glazer, Amihai, Bernard Grofman and Marc Robbins. 1987. Partisan and incumbency effects of 1970s congressional redistricting. American Journal of Political Science, 30(3):680-701. (Reprinted in Susan A. McManus (Ed.), Reapportionment and Representation in Florida, Lake Geneva, Wisconsin: Paladin House, 1991.)
- (50) Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman, Richard Hartley, Mark O. Kilgour and Nicholas Miller. 1987. The uncovered set in spatial voting games. Theory and Decision, 23:129-156.
- (51) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1987. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a majority winner in n-dimensional spatial voting games: An intuitive geometric approach. American Journal of Political Science, 32(4):709-728.
- (52) Owen, Guillermo and Bernard Grofman. 1988. Optimal partisan gerrymandering. Political Geography Quarterly, 7(1):5-22.
- (53) Schofield, Norman, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1988. The core and the stability of group choice in spatial voting games. American Political Science Review, 82(1):195-211.
- (54) Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. 1988. Rousseau's general will: A Condorcetian perspective. American Political Science Review, 82(2):567-576. (Reprinted in J. Paul Johnston and Harvey Pasis (Eds.), Representation and Electoral Systems: Canadian Perspectives, NJ: Prentice Hall of Canada, 1990. Translated and reprinted in abridged form as La volonté generale de Rousseau: perspective Condorcéene. In P. Crepel and C. Gilain (Eds.), des Actes du Colloque International Condorcet. Paris: Editions Minerve, 1989.) Reprinted in Literature Criticism, Vol. 104, Warren, MI: Gale Group; also reprinted in John T. Scott (ed) Jean Jacques Rousseau: Critical Assessments of Leading Political Philosophers, Routledge, 2006).
- (55) Brace, Kimball, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard Niemi. 1988. Minority voting equality: The 65 percent rule in theory and practice. Law and Policy, 10(1):43-62.
- (56) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1988. Ideological consistency as a collective phenomenon. American Political Science Review, 82(3):64-75.



PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)

- (57) Grofman, Bernard and Michael Migalski. 1988. Estimating the extent of racially polarized voting in multicandidate elections. Sociological Methods and Research, 16(4):427-454.
- (58) Grofman, Bernard, Scott L. Feld and Guillermo Owen. 1989. Finagle's law and the Finagle point, a new solution concept for two-candidate competition in spatial voting games. American Journal of Political Science, 33(2):348-375.
- (59) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. 1989. Black representation: Making sense of electoral geography at different levels of government. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 14(2):265-279.
- (60) Feld, Scott L., Bernard Grofman and Nicholas Miller. 1989. Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 12(4/5):405-416. (Reprinted in Paul E. Johnson (Ed.), Mathematical Modelling in Political Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989.)
- (61) Erfle, Stephen, Henry McMillan and Bernard Grofman. 1989. Testing the regulatory threat hypothesis: Media coverage of the energy crisis and petroleum pricing in the late 1970s. American Politics Quarterly, 17(2):132-152.
- (62) Miller, Nicholas, Bernard Grofman and Scott L. Feld. 1989. The geometry of majority rule. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1(4):379-406.
- (63) Grofman, Bernard and Barbara Norrander. 1990. Efficient use of reference group cues in a single dimension. Public Choice, 64:213-227.
- (64) Grofman, Bernard N. 1990. Toward a coherent theory of gerrymandering: Bandemer and Thornburg. In Bernard Grofman (Ed.), Political Gerrymandering and the Courts. New York: Agathon Press, 29-63.
- (65) Erfle, Stephen, Henry McMillan and Bernard Grofman. 1990. Regulation via threats: politics, media coverage and oil pricing decisions. Public Opinion Quarterly, 54(1):48-63.
- (66) Niemi, Richard G., Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci and Thomas Hofeller. 1990. Measuring compactness and the role of a compactness standard in a test for partisan and racial gerrymandering. Journal of Politics, 52(4):1155-1181.
- (67) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1990. Collectivities as actors. Rationality and Society, 2(4):429-448.



PROFESSIONAL ARTICLES (in print) (cont.)

- (68) Hall, Richard L. and Bernard Grofman. 1990. The committee assignment process and the conditional nature of committee bias. American Political Science Review, 84(4):1149-1166.
- (69) Grofman, Bernard, and Lisa Handley. 1991. The impact of the Voting Rights Act on black representation in southern state legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16(1):111-127.
- (70) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. 1991. Incumbency advantage, voter loyalty and the benefit of the doubt. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 3(2):115-137.
- (71) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Statistics without substance: A critique of Freedman et al. and Clark and Morrison. Evaluation Review, 15(6): 746-769.
- (72) Grofman, Bernard and Lisa Handley. 1992. Identifying and remedying racial gerrymandering. Journal of Law and Politics, 8(2):345-404.
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- (T6) Report to the Special Master on methodology used to insure compliance with standards of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, *Flateau v. Anderson*. U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, June 7, 1982, photo-offset.
- (T7) The disadvantageous effects of at-large elections on the success of minority candidates for the Charlotte and Raleigh City Councils. Prepared testimony in *Gingles v. Edmisten*. U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, August 1983, photo-offset.
- (T8) Effects of multimember districts in state legislative elections in eight North Carolina counties, 1978-1982. Prepared testimony in *Gingles v. Edmisten*, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, August 1983, photo-offset. (Also see R22.)
- (T9) Report on prima facie evidence of political gerrymandering in the 1983 California Congressional redistricting plan, plus Rejoinder. Prepared testimony in *Badham v. Eu*, U.S. District Court for the State of California, December 1983, photo-offset.
- (T10) Report on the effects of the proposed redistricting plan for the South Carolina Senate. Prepared testimony in *South Carolina v. U.S.*, U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, photo-offset, July 1984.

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- (T12) Affidavit in *Jackson v. Nash County*, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, April 1986.
- (T13) Affidavits in *U.S. v. City Council of Los Angeles*, U.S. District Court for the State of California, July 1986.
- (T14) Declarations in *Gomez v. City of Watsonville*, U.S. District Court for the State of California, August and October 1986.
- (T15) Declarations in *McGhee et al. v. Granville County of North Carolina*, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, 1987.
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- (T17) Affidavits in *Republican National Committee of North Carolina v. James G. Martin*, U.S. District Court for the State of North Carolina, July, August 1988.
- (T18) Report in *Chisom v. Roemer*, Civil Action No. 86-4075 in the Eastern District of Louisiana, October 1988, revised March 1989.
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- (T21) Report for the Alaska Districting Commission on racially polarized voting in elections to the Alaska legislature, May 1991.
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- (T23) Declaration in *Pope et al. v. Blue et al.*, U.S. District Court, Western District, Charlotte, North Carolina Division, March 5, 1992.
- (T24) Declaration in *Prosser v. State of Wisconsin Board of Elections*, U.S. District Court for the State of Wisconsin, April 1992.
- (T25) Reports for State of Alaska on the 1992 legislative districts, November 1993, January 1994.

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- (T31) Expert witness affidavit in *Rodriguez et al. v. Pataki, et al.*, Case No. 02 Civ. 618, 01 Civ. 3843, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, May 11, 2002.
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- (B84) Grofman, Bernard. The Downsian model of elections. 2000. In Richard Rose (ed.) International Encyclopedia of Elections. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 70-72.
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- (B92) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Arrow's impossibility theorem. In Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 25-27.
- (B93) Grofman, Bernard. 2004. Black's single-peakedness condition. In Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider (eds.), Encyclopedia of Public Choice, 43-45.
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- (B106) Grofman, Bernard, Shaun Bowler and Andre Blais. 2008. Editors' Introduction. In Grofman, Bernard, Shaun Bowler, and Andre Blais (Eds.) Duverger's Law in Canada, India, the U.S. and the U.K. Berlin: Springer Verlag. 1-12.
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- (B116) Grofman, Bernard. Forthcoming. Comment on Fiscal Coercion and Social Welfare in Federal Systems of Government. In Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Stanley L. Winer (eds.) Coercion and Social Welfare in Contemporary Public Finance. New York: Springer.
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- (B119) Grofman, Bernard. 2016. Gordon Tullock: My Memories of an Altruist who Denied Altruism. Bioeconomics. 115-116.
- (B120) Grofman, Bernard. 2018. Book Review: Renwick and Pilet, 'Faces on the Ballot: The Personalization of Electoral Systems in Europe.' Party Politics.
- (B121) Grofman, Bernard. 2022 Book Review: Passarelli, 'Preferential Voting Systems: Influence on Intra-Party Competition and Voting Behavior.' Party Politics.
- (B122) Cervas, Jonathan and Bernard Grofman. 2021. Communication: The Unanticipated Effect of Covid-19 on House Apportionment. Social Sciences Quarterly 102:2432–2434.

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- (S1) Grofman, Bernard. 1971. Voting tactics: A neglected study, parts I, II. Parliamentary Journal, 12(3):3-15; 12(4):19-26.
- (S2) Grofman, Bernard and Howard Scarrow. 1977. Who knows the score on the board of supervisors? 1977. Opinion-Editorial Page, Newsday, March 6, 1977.
- (S3) Grofman, Bernard. 1979. My years as parliamentarian to the United States National Student Association. Parliamentary Journal, 20:18-21.
- (S4) Grofman, Bernard and Howard Scarrow. 1981. The riddle of apportionment: Equality of what? National Civic Review, 70(5):242-254.
- (S5) Grofman, Bernard. 1984. The Democratic Party is alive and well. Society, 18-21.
- (S6) Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. 1986. Court should plunge deeper into gerrymandering thicket. Opinion-Editorial Page, Los Angeles Times, July 15.
- (S7) Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. 1986. California's gerrymander and the U.S. Supreme Court. Opinion-Editorial Page, The Sacramento Bee, July 30.
- (S8) Grofman, Bernard. 1987. Should city councils be elected by district? PRO. Western Cities Magazine, 4:30-31.
- (S9) Baker, Gordon E. and Bernard Grofman. 1988. What now for gerrymandering? Opinion-Editorial Page, The San Diego Union, November 18.
- (S10) Loewen, James W. and Bernard Grofman. 1989. Comment: Recent developments in methods used in voting rights litigation. Urban Lawyer 21(3):589-604.
- (S11) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Voting rights, voting wrongs: The legacy of Baker v. Carr. A report of the Twentieth Century Fund. New York: Priority Press (distributed through the Brookings Institution), 1991.
- (S12) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Voting rights may be an issue in Santa Ana. Opinion-Editorial Page, Los Angeles Times (Orange County Edition), August 5.
- (S13) Grofman, Bernard. 1991. Race and redistricting: No one is using the Voting Rights Act to "whiten" majority districts. Opinion-Editorial Page, Washington Post, October 21.
- (S14) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. High court ruling won't doom racial gerrymandering. Opinion-Editorial Page, Chicago Tribune, July 9.

SEMIPROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS (in print) (cont.)

- (S15) Grofman, Bernard. 1993. The Denny beating trial: justice in the balance. Opinion-Editorial Page, Chicago Tribune, November 3.
- (S16) Reynolds, Andrew S. and Bernard N. Grofman. 1994. Everyone loses in South Africa boycott. Opinion-Editorial Page, Chicago Tribune, March 28.
- (S17) Grofman, Bernard. 1994. An introduction to racial bloc voting analysis. With an annotated select bibliography on racial bloc voting and related topics. Atlanta, GA: Southern Regional Council.
- (S18) Grofman, Bernard. Supreme Court will examine partisan gerrymandering in 2017. *Monkey Cage*, *Washington Post*, January 30, 2017 (on-line)
- (S19) Bernard Grofman and German Feierherd. The U.S. could be free of gerrymandering. Here's how other countries do redistricting *Monkey Cage*, *Washington Post*, August 7, 2017 (on-line) [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/07/the-supreme-court-will-soon-consider-gerrymandering-heres-how-changes-in-redistricting-could-reduce-it/?utm\\_term=.bf54690edf73](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/08/07/the-supreme-court-will-soon-consider-gerrymandering-heres-how-changes-in-redistricting-could-reduce-it/?utm_term=.bf54690edf73)
- (S20) Grofman, Bernard and Jonathan Cervas. Pennsylvania has to draw new congressional districts, but getting rid of gerrymandering will be harder than you think. *Monkey Cage*, *Washington Post*, February 9, 2018 (on-line) [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/09/now-pennsylvania-has-to-draw-new-house-districts-but-getting-rid-of-gerrymandering-is-harder-than-you-think/?utm\\_term=.2b64e8d8d1ad](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/09/now-pennsylvania-has-to-draw-new-house-districts-but-getting-rid-of-gerrymandering-is-harder-than-you-think/?utm_term=.2b64e8d8d1ad)
- (S21) Grofman, Bernard. This Might be the Way to Prove Partisan Gerrymandering according to the New Supreme Court Standard. *Monkey Cage*, *Washington Post*, July 9, 2018 (on-line) [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/09/this-might-be-the-way-to-prove-partisan-gerrymandering-according-to-the-new-supreme-court-standard/?utm\\_term=.4a1d509a5732](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/07/09/this-might-be-the-way-to-prove-partisan-gerrymandering-according-to-the-new-supreme-court-standard/?utm_term=.4a1d509a5732)
- (S22) Grofman, Bernard. What Joe Biden can learn from Harry Truman -WP *Monkey Cage* October 1, 2021. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/01/democrats-skirmish-over-their-omnibus-bill-heres-what-they-can-learn-harry-truman/>

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- (O1) Chicago. In David Glazier (Ed.), Student Travel in America. New York: Pyramid Publication, 1968. (Under pseudonym.)
- (O2) Chicago: Hyde Park and the University of Chicago, the Loop and Near-North. In Where the Fun is: East of the Mississippi. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1969. (Under pseudonym.)

#### SOCIAL SCIENCES WORKING PAPERS AND RESEARCH REPORTS

- (WP1) Note: Confessions of a mad modeler, Research Report R6, School of Social Sciences, University of California, June 1978.
- (WP2) Note: The paradox of voting in a faculty appointment decision (with Steven Brown). Research Report R6, School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, June 1978.

#### WEBSITE POSTINGS

- (W4) Communication: Omitted Candidate Bias. Annals of In-Comparable Studies (on-line journal), April 1, 2016. <http://www.incomparablestudies.com>
- (W5) Communication: A Brief Comment on the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in *Evenwel v. Abbott*. April 4, 2016. <https://casetext.com/posts/a-brief-comment-on-evenwel-v-abbott>
- (W6) Communication: Two Modest Proposals for the Wall with Mexico. Annals of In-Comparable Studies (annual on-line satirical journal), April 1, 2017. <http://www.incomparablestudies.com>
- (W7) Communication: Great White Whale Milk Company. Annals of In-Comparable Studies (annual on-line satirical journal), April 1, 2018. <http://www.incomparablestudies.com>
- (W8) Communication: Good Fences Make Good Neighbors (with Fritz Tailor). Annals of In-Comparable Studies (annual on-line satirical journal), April 1, 2019. <http://www.incomparablestudies.com>
- (W9) Communication: How Likely is Trump to Lose the Popular Vote but Win the Electoral College? August 2020 [3streamsblog@gmail.com](mailto:3streamsblog@gmail.com)
- (W10) Communication: Does Donald Trump Really Believe He Won the 2020 Election? *Election Law Blog*, November 27, 2020. <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=119100>

WEBSITE POSTINGS (cont.)

- (W11) Communication: Traffic Fatalities as an Objective Indicator of Level of Democracy. *Annals of In-Comparable Studies* (annual on-line satirical journal). April 1, 2021. <http://www.incomparablestudies.com>
- (W12) Communication: 2006 Poem on the Renewal of the Voting Rights Act. (political satire) Election Law Blog, November 27, 2020. Guest Post/Poem from A Wuffle (footnotes by Bernie Grofman): Countdown to (VRA) Renewal | Election Law Blog
- (W13) Communication: Bernard Grofman and Jonathan Cervas. 2022 forthcoming. “The 2024 WWE Grudge Match of the Century” (political satire). IPS, TBA
- (W14) Bernie Grofman. Communication: “Can Partisan Fairness Be Melded with Good Government Criteria”\_ John Nagle’s Intriguing Solution” *Election Law Blog*, August 14, 2021. <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124078>
- (W15) Bernie Grofman. Communication: “How Best to do Prisoner Data Reallocation, i.e., How Best to Mitigate Prison Gerrymandering?” *Election Law Blog*\_ August 16, 2021. <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124127>
- (W16) Bernie Grofman. Communication: “Cognizability as the Neglected Fourth C of Good Government Redistricting Criteria” *Election Law Blog*, August 23, 2021. <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124127> <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124223> <https://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/GROFMAN-Cognizability.docx>
- (W17) Jonathan Cervas and Bernie Grofman . Communication: “Fracking: A Contiguity Related Redistricting Criterion” Election Law Blog, August 31, 2021. <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124127> <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124386>
- (W18) Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley , and David Lublin. “Can Social Science Evidence Be Trusted in Voting Rights Litigation.” (abstract plus SSRN link to full paper posted). *Election Law Blog*, September 9, 2021. <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124127>
- (W19) Bernard Grofman and Jonathan Cervas. Communication: “New Approaches to Compactness” *Election Law Blog*, September 13, 2021. <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124127> <https://electionlawblog.org/?p=124386>
- (W20) Bernard Grofman and Haotian Chen. 2022 forthcoming. “Bellwether Counties are Mostly a Matter of Chance and are now Poor Predictors of Presidential Election Results.” *London School of Economics Political Science Blog*.
- (W21) Bernard Grofman 2022. “Stupid Politics 101.” *London School of Economics Political Science Blog*

CURRENT RESEARCH

My two main (but very much overlapping) research areas could be characterized as (1) comparative politics in which the U.S. is considered but one case among many, with a focus on representation, e.g., electoral rules and constitutional design; redistricting and voting rights; voter choice and political party competition, and the structure of governing coalitions, and (2) behavioral social choice, linking mathematical models of group and individual decision making and information processing to empirical evidence. And I have interests in political persuasion and political propaganda, including political cartooning and satire; as well as a strong interest in citizen statistical literacy to help ordinary voters make sense of the increasing use of numbers and graphs in the media and in political communications and to help them understand statistical fallacies. Since the range of my interests spans most political science subfields, I now tend to describe myself as a methodologist, though I also see myself as a student of empirical democratic theory. Moreover, my interests are interdisciplinary, e.g., involving work at the intersection of political science and economics, and political science and law.



CONFERENCE RELATED FUNDING

- 2018 CSD Conference on Money and Politics, Part II (co-organized with Desmond King, with \$5,000 funding from the Peltason Center for the Study of Democracy and supplemental funding from the Peltason Chair of Democracy Studies) Newport Beach, March 3-4.
- 2017 Conference on Money and Politics, Part I (co-organized with Desmond King, with approximately \$8,000 funding from Nuffield College, Oxford University, and supplemental funding from the Peltason Chair, and with \$1,000 additional funding from the Peltason Center for the Study of Democracy; held at Oxford University, September 15-16.
- 2016 CSD Conference on Duverger's Law in Historical Perspective (Peltason Chair, with \$1,000 supplemental funding from the Peltason Center for the Study of Democracy; co-organized with Annie Laurent, University of Lille, II and Bernard Dolez, University of Paris, I; held in Frejus, France, May 26-28).
- 2016 CSD Conference on New Developments in the Study of Cabinet Coalition Formation Processes. (Peltason Chair, with \$1,000 supplemental funding From the Peltason Center for the Study of Democracy, and supplemental support from the Belgian Academy of Sciences in the form of conference facilities April 28-30 at their Rome Center in the Borghese Gardens; co-organized with Patrick Dumont, University of Luxembourg).
- 2016 CSD Conference on New Developments in the Study of Political Persuasion (Peltason Chair, with \$10,000 supplemental funding from the Peltason Center for the Study of Democracy; held in Laguna Beach, January 8-10).
- 2011-12 Collaborative Workshop on Ethnic Politics and Electoral Democracy (held in Zurich in June, 2012, with principal support from NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich, \$30,000, and supplemental funding from the Peltason Chair And the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy; with Daniel Bochsler, ETH Zurich)
- 2008 CSD Conference on Long Term Consequences of Electoral Rules Change: Comparing Italy and Japan. Bologna Italy, November 28-29, 2008. (Peltason Chair, with supplemental funding of \$7,500 from the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy).
- 2006 CSD Conference on Plurality and Runoff Methods in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom (Canadian Embassy, \$5,000, UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, \$5,000; with Shaun Bowler), February 17-20.
- 2005 IMBS Conference on Spatial Social Choice, December 9-11 (UCI Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Sciences and the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy; with Donald Saari.)

CONFERENCE RELATED FUNDING (cont.)

- 2004 CSD Conference on Pluralitarian/Majoritarian Electoral Systems (Borchard Foundation, \$25,000, with \$2,500 supplemental funding from the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, held in Missillac, France, June; with James Adams and Shaun Bowler).
- 2000-01 CSD Conference on Comparative Redistricting (NSF Program in Political Science, \$22,000, with \$5,000 supplemental funding from CSD, the UCI Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research, and the School of Social Sciences; with Lisa Handley).
- 1998 CSD Conference on Mixed Electoral Systems that Emulate the German Model (UC Center for the German and European Studies, \$10,000, and \$5,000 supplemental funding from the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, with Matthew Shugart and Martin Wattenberg)
- 1997 CSD Conference on Electoral and Party Systems in Scandinavia: Origins and Evolution (UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, \$11,000, with Arend Lijphart).
- 1996 CSD Conference on Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote (UCI Center for the Study of Democracy, \$11,000, with Shaun Bowler).
- 1994-95 Conference on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Thirty Year Perspective. (Joyce Foundation #446740-49317, \$18,500, with additional funding by the Federal Judicial Center ).
- 1991-92 CSD Conference on Japanese, Korean and U.S. Election Practices in Comparative Perspective (UC Pacific Rim Research Program, \$14,700, with additional funding from the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy; with Sung Chull Lee, Rein Taagepera and Brian Woodall).
- 1991-92 Workshops on Politics and the Democratization Process, (National Science Foundation, Political Science Program SES# 91-13984 (\$42,000, with Russell Dalton and Harry Eckstein).
- 1989-90 A Conference on the Voting Rights Act: A Twenty-five Year Perspective (Rockefeller Foundation, \$50,000, with Thomas Mann and Chandler Davidson, under the auspices of The Brookings Institution).
- 1988 A Conference on 'The Calculus of Consent': A Twenty-five Year Perspective (Liberty Fund; with Donald Wittman)
- 1982 A Conference on Information Pooling. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 82-09109, \$26,300, with Guillermo Owen and Scott L. Feld).

CONFERENCE RELATED FUNDING (cont.)

- 1980      A Conference on Representation and Apportionment Issues in the 1980s. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF #SES 79-26813, \$20,200, with Arend Lijphart, Robert McKay, and Howard Scarrow; additional \$8,000 funding provided by the American Bar Association)
- 1979      A Conference on Voter Turnout. National Science Foundation, Political Science Program (NSF SOC 78-19433, \$14,400, with Richard Brody and Herbert Weisberg)

CONFERENCE PAPERS 1999-2024 (unpublished)

- (C59) Commisso, Ellen and Bernard Grofman. Liberty, equality, fraternity: Tripolarity, cycles and the dynamics of party competition in post-socialist Eastern Europe. Presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia.
- (C67) Gray, Mark and Bernard Grofman. "Several (likely to be contentious) claims about the nature and prerequisites of democracy." Prepared for delivery at the Second London School of Economics Workshop on "Freedom and Democracy," London, June 15, 2001.
- (C72) Grofman, Bernard and Samuel Merrill. "What does it mean to offer a "solution" to the problem of ecological inference?" Paper presented at the Conference on New Advances in Ecological Inference, June 17-18, 2002, Cambridge MA.
- (C82) Grofman, Bernard. "Statistics and Social Choice: Connections Between Sports and Politics." Paper presented at the University of California, Irvine Institute for Mathematical Sciences Conference on Decisions, Sports, and Statistics" December 4, 2004.
- (C88) Wayman, Frank, Bernard Grofman and Matt Barreto. "Party ID in the US in Longitudinal Perspective." Presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Conference, Nicosia Cyprus, April 27, 2006.
- (C94) Gray, Mark, Paul Perl and Bernard Grofman. "More Than an Ocean Apart: The Americas and the College of Cardinals 1903-2005." Prepared for delivery at the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion conference, Portland, Oregon. October 19-22, 2006.
- (C96) Grofman, Bernard, James Fowler, Natalie Masuoka and Scott Feld. "Social Choice Approaches to Social Exchange Networks." Presented at a Colloquium of the Netherlands Group in Social Choice, Tilburg University, April 5, 2007. Also presented as a colloquium at the University of Paris, I, June 5, 2007.
- (C98) Schneider, Carsten Q. and Bernard Grofman. "Visual Presentation of Fuzzy QCA Data." Paper presented at panel on "Political Methodology," European Consortium for Political Research, Pisa, Italy, September 6-8, 2007. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Comparative Social Sciences, Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan, July 15-16, 2006, under the title "It Might Look Like a Regression Equation...but It Is Not! An Intuitive Approach to the Presentation of QCA and fs/QCA Results."
- (C104) Grofman, Bernard. "Voting as Habit." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Monterey, California, March, 2010.

CONFERENCE PAPERS (unpublished) (cont.)

- (C105) Feld, Scott L. and Bernard Grofman. "Creating and Maintaining a Scale-Free Core-Periphery Fractal Network" Annual Meeting of the International Society for Social Networks. Riva del Garda, Italy, June 30-July 4, 2010.
- (C107) Grofman, Bernard. "Voting Rights and Minority Representation in the United States and England in Comparative Perspective." Presented at a Conference on the Impact of Electoral Institutions and Political Parties, University of Manchester, Manchester England, September 20, 2010.
- (C114) Garcia, Jennifer, Sierra Powell, and Bernard Grofman. "Making It Easier or Harder for Ex-Felons to Vote: Political and Rhetorical Perspectives." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Los Angeles, March, 2013.
- (C116) Grofman, Bernard, Yogesh Uppal and Malte Pehl. "Duverger's Law in India." Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Charleston, S.C., March 7-9, 2014.
- (C117) Grofman, Bernard and Joseph Godfrey "Aspiration Models of Committee Voting." Prepared for delivery at the conference on "Public Choice and Social Choice," Condorcet Center, University of Rennes, May 22-23, 2014.
- (C118) Grofman, Bernard and Stanley Winer. "Comparing Economic and Political Competition." Prepared for delivery at the Conference on the Free Market, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland, June 9-15, 2014.
- (C119) Grofman, Bernard. "Reflections on Electoral Competition." Presented at the International Conference on Electoral Competition, Laguna Beach, California, December 14-15, 2014.
- (C121) Tan, Netina and Bernard Grofman. "Multiseat Plurality Bloc Voting in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: Comparing Singapore, Cameroon, Djibouti, and Chad." Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Asian Studies Association, Singapore, July 17-19, 2014; also presented, under the title "Electoral Rules that Dictators Love," at the Conference on Comparative Elections, Belgian Academy of Sciences, Rome, September 16-18, 2015; also presented, under the title "Electoral Engineering and Electoral Manipulation," at the 7<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference on Mathematics and the Social Sciences, University of Auckland, New Zealand, February 18, 2016.
- (C122) Lublin, David, Thomas Brunell, Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley. "The Election of African-Americans and Latinos to State Legislatures and the U.S. Congress in 2015." Presented at the Workshop on the Representation of Women and Minorities, McGill University and Université de Montréal, August 23-24, 2015.

CONFERENCE PAPERS (unpublished) (cont.)

- (C124) Bernard Grofman. "Duverger's Law and Beyond." Paper presented at the Conference on the 65<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Duverger's Law." Frejus, France, May 26-27, 2016.
- (C128) Grofman, Bernard. "Steering between Scylla and Charybdis: *Thornburg v. Gingles* and *Shaw v. Reno*." Presented at the Conference on Legislatures, Courts and Voting Rights: Developments since the 2013 *Shelby County v. Holder* Decision. University of Pittsburgh Law School, April 10, 2017.
- (C129) Grofman, Bernard. "Electoral Rules and Ethnic and Gender Representation in Global Perspective." Prepared for delivery at the Conference on Democracy and Inclusion, University of Zurich, June 14-16, 2017.
- (C131) Grofman, Bernard and Scott L. Feld. "Graph Theory Perspectives on Collective Representation and the Potential for Computational Social Choice." Prepared for delivery at the Conference on Voting Rules to Select Multiple Winners, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, June 25-29, 2017.
- (C132) Saari, Donald and Bernard Grofman. "A Problem for Computational Social Choice: Reconciling Quota and House Monotonicity in Proportional Methods for Apportionment." Prepared for delivery at the Conference on Voting Rules to Select Multiple Winners, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, June 25-29, 2017.
- (C133). Grofman, Bernard. "Laws of Redistricting." Presented at the National Conference of State Legislatures Legislative Forum, Panel on Redistricting and Elections, Coronado, California, December 10-13, 2017.
- (C134) Grofman, Bernard. "Democratic Systems and Political Representation: Nature and Effects of Electoral Rules." Keynote Address at the Conference on Mathematics and Politics: Democratic Decision Making. Royal Palace of Herrenhausen, Hannover, Germany. May 28-30, 2018. A revised version prepared as an invited special session address at the 20th Annual International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development, Moscow, April 8-12, 2019.
- (C135) Grofman, Bernard. "A Public Choice Perspective on Redistricting." Prepared for the Academy Forums Workshop, University of California, Irvine, February 27, 2019; a revised version presented as a Plenary Address at the Annual Conference of the Public Choice Society, Louisville, Kentucky. March 14-16, 2019.
- (C137) Grofman, Bernard. "Paradoxes of Representation in Spatial Voting Models." Prepared for delivery at the Conference on "Spatial Models of Party Competition: Recent Developments." Mannheim, Germany, Mannheim Center for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, July 26-27, 2019.

RECENT CONFERENCE PAPERS (unpublished) (cont .)

- (C139) Grofman, Bernard. A Public Choice Perspective on the Voting Rights Act.. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Newport Beach, California, March 12-14, 2020 (conference cancelled).
- (C140) Grofman, Bernard. Can Social Science Evidence in Voting Rights Litigation be Trusted? . Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Nashville, Tennessee March 10-12, 2022.
- (C141) Grofman, Bernard. Institutional Failures in Redistricting. Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Nashville, Tennessee March 10-12, 2022.
- (C142) Grofman, Bernard. and Mark Wilson. Uniform Swing versus Proportional Swing: Predicting What Happens Between Elections. Prepared for Presentation at the Public Choice Society, Seattle, Washington, March 16-18, 2023.



OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION 2008-2024

Chair, Panel on “Formal and Empirical Models of Voting and Elections.” Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, March 7-8, 2008.

Invited roundtable participant, The Voting Rights Act and the Deconstruction of the Republic.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 27-31, 2008.

Chair, Panel on Re-Examining Strategic Voting. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 27-31, 2008.

Discussant, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Panel on “Electoral Engineering and Political Representation in Ethnically Divided Societies” Washington, D.C., August, 2008.

Discussant, Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Las Vegas, March 10-12, 2009.

Discussant, Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Monterey, California, March 12-14, 2010.

Invited discussant, Conference on “The World Values Survey,” Center for the Study of Democracy, UCI, March 11, 2011.

Co-organizer (with Michael Alvarez), Conference on “Election Administration in the U.S.: Ten Years After *Bush v. Gore*.” Laguna Beach, CA, April 16-17, 2011.

Co-organizer (with Mark Franklin and Alex Trechsel), Conference on “Internet, Voting and Democracy in Global Perspective.” Laguna Beach, CA, May 14-15, 2011.

Invited discussant, “Franco-Italian Workshop on “Two Bloc Politics in France and Italy.” Department of Political Science, University of Bologna, September 16-17, 2011.

Invited discussant, Conference on New Perspectives on Public Debt, European Center for the Study of Public Choice. Sapienza University of Rome, September 26-28, 2011. Panel on “Legislative Voting on Budgetary Issues.”

Invited discussant, Conference on “Revisiting Party Identification: American and European Perspectives.” CISE (Center for Italian Electoral Studies), Department of Government, LUISS University, Rome, October 4-5, 2011.

Invited discussant, Final Overview Panel, Conference on “Constitutional Design and Conflict Management in Africa,” Climate Change and African Political Stability Program, Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas, Austin, November 14-15, 2011

OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION (cont.)

Discussant, Panel on “Bio-Economics,” World Congress of the Public Choice Societies, Miami, March 8-12, 2012.

Co-organizer (with Andre Blais, Nina Wiesehomeier, Ignacio Lago and Pedro Magalhaes), Conference on “Effects of District Magnitude.” University of Lisbon. Lisbon, Portugal, May 28-30, 2012.

Co-organizer (with Daniel Bochsler), Conference on “Ethnic Parties and Ethnic Conflict.” University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland, June 14-16, 2012.

Co-organizer (with Bernhard Wessels), Conference on “New Developments in Spatial Modeling of Political Party Competition.” Wissenschaft Zentrum, Berlin, Germany, July 14-15, 2012.

Invited discussant at a theme panel discussing the draft report of Bingham Powell's Presidential Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance, cancelled Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, August 28-September 2, 2012.

Co-organizer (with Samuel Issacharoff, Richard Pildes, and Daniel Bochsler), Conference on “Constitutional Design and Ethnic Conflict.” New York University Law School, November 17, 2012.

Panel Chair, “Social Choice Theory.” Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, March 6-9, 2013.

Invited discussant. International Conference on “Gender Quotas.” McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada, October 3-5, 2013.

Participant, “Roundtable on Andranik Tangian’s *Mathematical Theory of Democracy*.” Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Charleston, South Carolina, March 6-9, 2014.

Invited discussant, Conference on “Electoral Reform in the United States.” Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), Stanford University, March 14-15, 2014.

Invited discussant, Conference on “Public Choice and Democracy.” Department of Economics, University of Rennes, France, May 23, 2014.

Rapporteur and Discussant, UCI Institute for Mathematical and Behavioral Sciences ORU Conference on “Validation. What Is It?” February 13-14, 2015.

Introductory Remarks, UCI Institute for Mathematical and Behavioral Sciences ORU Conference on “Behavioral Social Choice: Bernie Grofman 70th Birthday Tribute.” March 6-7, 2015.

OTHER CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION (cont.)

Participant Roundtable on McLean and Urken (eds.) *Classics of Social Choice*.” Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Antonio, Texas, March 12-15, 2015.

Chair, “Roundtable on the Voting Rights Act.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 3-6, 2015.

Chair, “Roundtable on Party Nomination Processes.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 3-6, 2015.

Organizer, Center for the Study of Democracy Conference on “New Developments in Political Persuasion.” Laguna Beach California, April 9-10, 2016

Co-organizer (with Patrick Dumont), and discussant, Conference on “New Developments in Coalition Theory.” Belgian Academy in Rome, April 28-30, 2016.

Co-organizer (with Annie Laurent and Bernard Dolez), and discussant, Conference on “Duverger’s Law in Sixty Five Year Perspective.” Frejus, France, May 26-27, 2016.

Invited discussant, Conference on Democracy and Inclusion, University of Zurich, June 14-16, 2017.

Co-organizer (with Susumu Shikano), and discussant, Conference on “New Developments in Spatial Models of Party Competition, II.” Konstanz, Germany, July 15-16, 2017.

Plenary speaker, European Consortium for Political Research, “Graduate Workshop on Models and Methods.” Budapest, Hungary, August 6, 2017.

Co-organizer (with Desmond King), and discussant, Conference on “Money and Politics.” Oxford, UK, Nuffield College, September 15-16, 2017.

Chair and discussant, Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, panel on “Redistricting ” Chicago, March 5-7, 2018.

Chair, Panel on Donald Trump and the Past (and Future) of the Republican Party. Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Newport Beach, California, March 10-12, 2020 (conference cancelled).

Presenter, Redistricting Data Hub Redistricting and Data Convening Conference, Stanford University, Palo Alto California, September 17, 2022.

Chair and Discussant, Panel on Modeling Social Choice Rules and Their Effects Public Choice Society, Seattle, Washington, March 16-18, 2023.

INVITED COLLOQUIA 2023-

April 5 ,      Colloquium, “Redistricting in Comparative Perspective” Luiss University  
2023          Rome, Italy

April 25 ,      Colloquium, “Redistricting in Comparative Perspective” European University  
2023          Institute , Florence (Fiesole), Italy

INVITED COLLOQUIA (2006-2022)

May 29, 2019 Colloquium, “Aspiration Models to Explain Experimental Spatial Voting Game Outcomes.” Department of Economics University of Bayreuth, Germany.

May 16, 2019 Colloquium, “Explaining the Success of Ethnic Political Parties.” Department of Political Science, University of Siena, Italy.

April 13, 2019 Colloquium, “Explaining the Success of Ethnic Political Parties.” Department of Economics Nizhny Novgorod School of Higher Economics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russia.

June 20, 2018 Colloquium, “A Reasonable Choice Approach to Turnout.” V-DEM Institute, University of Gothenburg.

March 22, 2018 Colloquium, “A Reasonable Choice Approach to Turnout.” Department of Economics, University of Malaga

March 27-31, 2017 Seminar Presentations “Formal Models of Politics.” Juan March Institute, Carlos III University, Madrid.

May 19, 2016 Colloquium “Aspiration Models of Committee Voting,” Department of Economics, St. Etienne University, France.

April 18-22, 2016 Seminar Presentations “Spatial Models of Politics.” Department of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest.

June 14-26, 2015 Seminar Presentations, “Empirical Public Choice.” Program in Decision Sciences, University of Konstanz.

May 11, 2015 Colloquium, “Experimental Committee Games.” Center for Mathematics and Philosophy, University of Munich, Germany.

April 23, 2015 Colloquium, “Electoral Rules that Dictators Love.” Department of Economics, University of Linz, Austria.

April 20-24 2015 Seminar Presentations, “Spatial Models of Voting.” Department of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria.

April 23, 2015 Colloquium, “Electoral Rules that Dictators Love.” Department of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna.

INVITED COLLOQUIA (cont.)

|                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| May 12-20, 2014   | Seminar Presentations, "Behavioral Social Choice." Department of Economics, University of Caen, France.   |
| April 29, 2014    | Colloquium, "Evaluating the Effects of Electoral Rules on Party Competition." Juan March Institute, Juan Carlos III University, Madrid.   |
| April 7, 2014     | Colloquium, "Electoral Engineering." Department of Economics, University of Malaga, Spain.  |
| April 10, 2013    | Seminar Presentation, "The Nature and Impact of Public Comment on Congressional Redistricting in 2011-12." Straus Institute for Advanced Study in the Law, New York University Law School.  |
| March 5, 2013     | Seminar Presentation, "Voting Rights," Brennan Center for Social Justice, New York University Law School.   |
| October 17, 2012  | Bernard Grofman and Jennifer Garcia. Using Spanish Surname to Estimate Hispanic Voting Population in Voting Rights Litigation: A Bayesian Model of Context Effects. Seminar on Law, Economics and Politics, New York University Law School. |
| October 10, 2012  | Colloquium, "Electoral Engineering." Departments of Economics and Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.   |
| July 4, 2012      | Colloquium, "Is Turnout the Paradox that Killed Rational Choice.Theory?" Center for the Study of Democracy. Leuphana University, Lüneburg, Germany.   |
| July 3, 2012      | Annual Hans-Dieter Klingemann Invited Lecture, "Electoral Engineering." Center for the Study of Democracy, Leuphana University, Lüneburg , Germany.   |
| June 18, 2012     | Colloquium, "Is Turnout the Paradox that Killed Rational Choice Theory?" Department of Political Science, University of Zurich, Switzerland.  |
| June 28, 2011     | Colloquium. "French Two Round Electoral Politics: Is There a Model with Bite?" CERAPS, University of Lille, II.   |
| November 19 2010  | Colloquium. "Confessions of an Eclectic, Puzzle Loving, Reasonable Choice Modeler and Occasional Popcorn Machine." Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark.  |
| November 28, 2009 | Colloquium, "Models of Turnout" Institute for Governance and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris, II   |

INVITED COLLOQUIA (cont.)

- May, 2008. Series of talks on electoral systems and models of party competition for Economics Ph.D students associated with the Institute for Globalization and Economic Institutions (IRGEI), University of Paris, II.
- Feb. 5, 2008 Colloquium, “Electoral Systems and the Promotion of Effective Power-Sharing.” Sawyer Seminar Series: Power-Sharing in Deeply Divided Places, Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethnic Conflict, University of Pennsylvania.
- May-June 2007 Series of talks on electoral systems and models of party competition for Economics Ph.D. students associated with the Institute for Globalization and Economic Research (IREGEI), University of Paris, II.
- June 4, 2007 Colloquium, “Models of Committee Voting.” Center for Analysis Group in Economic Theory (GATE), University of Lyon, II.
- April 6, 2006 Joint colloquium, CSDP (Center for the Study of Democratic Politics) and LAPA (Law and Public Affairs), Princeton University



GRANTS FOR INSTRUCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, COMPUTER LABS, AND GRADUATE FELLOWSHIP SUPPORT

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| 1992-93 | Grant from UCI Committee on Instructional Development to develop a new course: "Introduction to Computer Use in the Social Sciences" (\$15,500)   |
| 1992    | Small grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities to attend the NEH Summer Institute on "Athenian Democracy." (\$3,250)  |
| 1992-94 | Grant for graduate student support in Public Choice (Sarah Scaife Foundation, \$50,000, with Amihai Glazer)   |
| 1993    | Grant from the UC Center for German and European Studies, University of California, to develop a new course to be co-taught with Professor Pertti Pesonen (Finnish Academy) on comparative political participation (\$10,000) |
| 1994    | Grant from the National Science Foundation to develop a computer lab for the technology enhanced teaching of under-graduate statistics (\$55,497, with Judith Treas).   |
| 1995-99 | Grant from the UC President's Office (IAPIF) to develop a long-distance learning course "The United States in Comparative Perspective." (\$17,174, with Arend Lijphart.   |
| 1997    | Grant from Instructional Improvement Fund (UCI Division of Undergraduate Education) to develop "Computer-Based Tutorials, and Self-Grading Homework Assignments for SS10A, Introduction to Statistics" (\$5,000)              |
| 1999-00 | Seed grant from UC Center for German and European Studies for graduate research support (\$3,000)   |
| 2000    | Grant from UCI Division of Undergraduate Education (Hewlett Foundation) for Problem-Based Learning materials for Economics 10C statistics course (\$4,500)  |
| 2000-01 | Seed grant from the UC Center for German and European Studies, University of California, for graduate research support (\$3,000)  |
| 2004-5  | Grant from Institute of European Studies to co-teach a graduate seminar with Prof. Giorgio Freddi (University of Bologna) (\$12,000)  |
| 2004-5  | Grant from University of California, MEXUS Program to supervise doctoral research (\$12,000 to Matthew Barreto)   |
| 2014-15 | Grant from Koch Foundation (\$5,000) to fund a one week visit to UCI by the senior Public Choice scholar, Professor Geoffrey Brennan, Australian National University.   |
| 2015-15 | Grant from Koch Foundation (\$5,000) to fund a one week visit to UCI by the senior Public Choice scholar, Professor Roger Congleton, West Virginia University.  |
| 2016-17 | Grant from Koch Foundation (\$5,000) to fund a one week visit to UCI by the senior Public Choice scholar, Professor Mark Crain  |
| 2019-20 | Grant from Koch Foundation (\$5,000) to fund a one week visit to UCI by the senior Public Choice scholar, Professor Iain Mclean, Oxford University.   |

CURRICULAR MATERIALS (in print and forthcoming)

- (CM1) Grofman, Bernard N. 1979. Note: Mo Fiorina's advice to children and other subordinates. Mathematics Magazine 52(5): 292-297.
- (CM2) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. Modeling jury verdicts. University Modules in Applied Mathematics.
- (CM3) Grofman, Bernard N. 1982. The pure theory of elevators. Mathematics Magazine, 55(1): 30-37.
- (CM4) Straffin, Philip and Bernard Grofman. 1984. Parliamentary coalitions: A tour of models. Mathematics Magazine 57(5): 259-274.
- (CM5) Grofman, Bernard. 1990. Pig and proletariat: Animal Farm as history, San Jose Studies, 16: 5-39.
- (CM6) Grofman, Bernard and Craig Brians. 1998. Class notes and exercises: computer-based research methods for the social sciences. New York: Longmans.
- (CM7) Grofman, Bernard. 2000. A primer on racial bloc voting analysis. In Nathaniel Persily (ed.) The Real Y2K Problem: Census 2000 Data and Redistricting Technology. New York: The Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law.
- (CM8) Adams, James, Bernard Grofman, and Samuel Merrill, III. Spatial Models of Politics, I: Basic Introduction. 2024 forthcoming. In Maurice Salles, Dan Felsenthal, Rudy Fara, and Nick Miller (eds.) *VoteDemocracy Project*. New York: Springer contract offered.

## COURSES TAUGHT

Elections and Voter Choice  
Computer-Based Research Methods in the Social Sciences (SS3A)  
Introduction to Public Choice, I and II  
The United States in Comparative Perspective  
Representation and Redistricting  
Law and Social Science  
Models of Collective Decision Making  
Introduction to Decision Analysis  
Introduction to Research Design  
Game Theory Applications in the Social Sciences  
Small Group Behavior  
Introduction to Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences  
Coalition Theory  
Political Propaganda and Satire  
Elementary Statistics (PS10A)  
Statistics for Public Policy Analysis (PS10B)  
Statistics for Citizen Literacy (PS10C)  
The Federalist Papers and the Art of Constitutional Design  
Comparative Public Policy  
Advanced Quantitative Methods in Political Science I  
Introductory Graduate Statistics for Political Science, I and II  
Spatial Models of Politics

## EDITORIAL BOARDS

1972-82 Manuscript Review Board: Behavioral Science.  
1980-83 American Journal of Political Science  
1983-85 Law and Society Review  
1986-88 Society for Orwellian Studies  
1987-89 American Politics Quarterly  
1989-91 Political Analysis  
1991- Public Choice  
1996-06 Electoral Studies  
1997-01 Journal of Politics  
1999-01 Advisory Board, Encyclopedia of Public Choice  
2001- Election Law Journal  
2001-12 Advisory Board, Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche (University of Bologna)  
2006-09 Canadian Journal of Political Science  
2008-10 Political Analysis  
2015-17 Annals of In-Comparable Studies (on-line annual review)  
2016-19 Homo Oeconomicus

OTHER REFEREEING/REVIEWING

- 1975- Occasional referee: American Journal of Political Science; Theory and Decision; Public Choice.
- 1976- Occasional referee: Political Methodology; National Science Foundation, Political Science Program.
- 1977- Occasional referee; Journal of the American Statistical Association; Social Science Research.
- 1978- Occasional referee: Psychological Review; National Science Foundation, Law and Social Sciences Program; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology; European Journal of Social Psychology; Journal of Mathematical Sociology.
- 1979- Occasional referee: Social Networks; National Science Foundation, Applied Mathematics Program.
- 1980- Occasional referee: Law and Policy Quarterly; National Institute of Mental Health; American Political Science Review, National Science Foundation, Sociology Program; National Science Foundation, Economics Program; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Legislative Studies Quarterly.
- 1981- Occasional referee: American Mathematical Monthly, Decision Sciences, Economic Inquiry.
- 1982- Occasional referee: Social Science Quarterly; Sociological Methods and Research; Western Political Quarterly (now Political Research Quarterly), Guggenheim Foundation; U.S. National Science Foundation, Developmental and Social Psychology Program; U.S. National Science Foundation, Decision, Risk and Management Science Program
- 1983- Occasional referee: Journal of Politics, Political Geography Quarterly (now Political Geography).
- 1984- Occasional referee: U.S. National Science Foundation, Information Systems Program; National Science Foundation, Program in Social Measurement and Analysis.
- 1986- Occasional referee: Review of Economic Studies.
- 1987- Occasional referee: British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Political Economy, Comparative Political Studies.
- 1988- Occasional referee: Social Choice and Welfare, Political Analysis, Polity.
- 1989- Occasional referee: National Science Foundation, Program in History and Philosophy of Science; Program in Political Science
- 1991- Occasional referee: Demography.
- 1992- Occasional referee: European Journal of Political Research.
- 1993- Occasional referee: Electoral Studies
- 1994- Occasional referee: Comparative Politics; Cambridge University Press
- 1994- Occasional referee: Urban Affairs Quarterly
- 1996- Occasional referee: Canadian Journal of Political Science
- 1997- Occasional referee: U.S. National Science Foundation, Program in Geography
- 1998- Occasional referee: Southeastern Political Review, Social Science History
- 1999- Occasional referee: European Journal of Political Economy

OTHER REFEREEING (cont.)

2003- Occasional referee, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM)  
2004- Occasional referee, Law and Society  
2005- Occasional referee, European Union Politics, Scandinavian Political Studies  
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization  
2008- Occasional referee, Austrian National Science Foundation  
2009- Occasional referee, Econometrica  
2013- Occasional referee, Political Science (New Zealand)  
2016- Occasional referee, Swiss National Science Foundation  
2017- Occasional referee, University of Pennsylvania Press  
2019 Occasional Referee, Complexity  
2021 Occasional Referee, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science

OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Chair, 1982-83, Lippincott Prize Committee for book-length work in political theory, American Political Science Association.

Section Program Organizer, Panels on "Positive Theory," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1984.

Member, 1985-86, Working Group on Collective Choice Institutions, appointed by the Committee on Basic Research in the Behavioral and Social Sciences, National Research Council.

Member, Executive Committee, 1986-89, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association.

Chair, 1988-92, George Hallett Book Prize Award Committee, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association.

Section Program Co-organizer, Panels on "Political Organizations," Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1990.

Member, 1990-91, Lasswell Prize Committee, International Society of Political Psychology.

Member, 1995-96, Carey McWilliam Award for Journalists Committee, American Political Science Association.

Chair, 1995-96, Richard Fenno Prize Committee, Legislative Studies Section, American Political Science Association.

Member, 1998, Luebbert Book Award Committee, Comparative Politics Section, American Political Science Association.

Member, 2000-2001, Advisory Board, UCLA Center for Governance.

Member, 2001-2002, Comparative Politics Prize Committee, Sage Award for best paper in comparative politics at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting.

Member, 2002, International Political Science Association Longley Prize Committee, Longley Award for best article published on Representation and Electoral Systems.

External Reviewer, Ten-year review, Department of Political Science, University of Bologna, November 27-29, 2003.

Member, 2007 Program Committee, First World Congress of Public Choice, Amsterdam, March 29-April 1.

Member, 2007 APSA Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, Weaver Award Committee for best paper in Representation and Electoral Systems section.

Member, 2007 APSA Heinz Eulau Award Committee for best paper in Perspectives on Politics

External Reviewer, Ph.D. Thesis of Annelise de Ridder, School of Business, University of Nijmegen, Netherland, May 2007.

External Reviewer, Ph.D. Thesis of Honorine Lescieux-Katir, Department of Economics, University of Paris, II, May 2010.

Member, 2008-11, International Advisory Committee, Centre for Voting and Parties, University of Copenhagen

Member, 2010-11 George Hallett Book Prize Award Committee, Section on Representation and Electoral Systems, American Political Science Association.

Member, 2012 Award Committee, Burdette Prize for Best Paper at the APSA Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association.

External Reviewer, Ph.D. Thesis of Michele Khouri-Hagot, Department of Economics, University of Paris, II, June 2012.

OTHER PROFESSIONAL SERVICE (cont.)

Member, International Advisory Board for the European Parliament 2014 Election Voting Advice Application (VAA) Project, European Union Democracy Observatory, European University Institute (Directed by Alex Trechsel).  
Member, 2013-15, International Advisory Board, Internet Voting in Canada Project, University of Toronto, Canada (Directed by Nicole Goodman)  
Member, 2014-15 Philip Converse Book Prize Award Committee, Section on Elections, Public Opinion & Voting Behavior, American Political Science Association.  
Consultant, 2020-21 Princeton Gerrymandering Project

UNIVERSITY SERVICE, SYSTEMWIDE

2010-15 Member, Administrative Advisory Board, University of California Center, Sacramento

UNIVERSITY SERVICE, UCI

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| 1977-79 | Member, University Committee on Lectures                             |
| 1977-79 | Faculty Advisor, UCI Chapter, Student Model United Nations           |
| 1983-84 | Member, University Library Committee                                 |
| 1987-89 | Member, University Privilege and Tenure Committee Hearing Panel      |
| 1988-89 | Member, Tierney Chair Search Committee                               |
| 1988-91 | Member, University Committee on Rules and Jurisdictions              |
| 1991-92 | Acting Chair, Focused Research Program in Public Choice              |
| 1994-96 | Member, University Committee on Rules and Jurisdictions              |
| 1995-96 | Member, Chancellor's Taskforce on Use of Educational Technology      |
| 2000-01 | Reviewer, UC System-wide Multi-campus Research Incentive Fund (MRIF) |
| 2001-02 | Member, UCI Search Committee for new Dean of Social Sciences         |



SERVICE TO THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UCI

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| 1980-81 | Special Schoolwide Selection Committee: Distinguished Student Scholars Program.           |
| 1981-82 | Chair, School of Social Sciences Faculty.   |
| 1991-92 | Chair, Committee for the Interdisciplinary Graduate Concentration in Public Choice.       |
| 1992-   | Member, Committee for the Interdisciplinary Ph.D Concentration in Public Choice           |
| 1996-02 | Member, Executive Committee, UCI Center for the Study of Democracy                        |
| 1999-01 | Member, School of Social Sciences Executive Committee                                     |
| 1999-00 | Co-Coordinator, Institute of Mathematical Behavioral Sciences, Colloquia                  |
| 1999-05 | Member, Executive Committee, Institute of Mathematical Behavioral Sciences ORU            |
| 2001-06 | Member, Executive Committee, Center for the Study of Democracy                            |
| 2001-06 | Member, UCI Center for the Study of Democracy Leadership Council                          |
| 2008-12 | Director, Center for the Study of Democracy   |
| 2011-12 | Member, Steering Committee, Experimental Social Sciences Laboratory                       |
| 2014    | Member, School External Search Committee for Chair of the Department of Political Science |

SERVICE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UCI

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| 1978-79 | Chair, Program in Politics and Society.   |
| 1979-89 | Organizer, Program in Politics and Society Colloquium Series (one quarter per year).                          |
| 1997-98 | Coordinator, Political Science Graduate Admissions  |
| 1982-83 | Acting Co-Chair, Program in Politics and Society (Spring Quarter).  |
| 1983-84 | Political Science Graduate Student Adviser.   |
| 1988-89 | Political Science Graduate Student Advise   |
| 1988-89 | Chair, Recruitment Committee in Mathematical Political Science.   |
| 1988-91 | Member, Recruitment Committee in Public Law.  |
| 1991-93 | Member, Joint Recruitment Committee in African-American Studies and Political Science                         |
| 1992-98 | Member, Political Science Graduate Committee  |
| 1996-97 | Chair, Recruitment Committee for Pacific Rim FTE in Political Science   |
| 1998-99 | Member, Easton Prize Committee, Department of Political Science   |
| 1998-00 | Member, Colloquium Committee, Institute for Mathematical Behavioral Science                                   |
| 1998-00 | Member, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for positions in Mathematical Behavioral Sciences                  |
| 1999-01 | Member, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for joint position in Chicano/Latino Studies and Political Science |
| 1999-00 | Coordinator, Political Science Graduate Admissions  |
| 2001-02 | Member, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for positions in Democratization and Democratic Transitions        |

SERVICE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UCI (cont.)

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| 2001-02 | Member, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for positions in Mathematical Behavioral Science          |
| 2002-03 | Coordinator, Political Science Graduate Admissions   |
| 2002-04 | Chair, Interdisciplinary Search Committee for position in Democratization and Democratic Transitions |
| 2005-07 | Graduate Director, Fellows Program, Center for the Study of Democracy                                |
| 2005-06 | Chair, Search Committee for position in Public Law/Judicial Behavior                                 |
| 2015-16 | Chair, Search Committee for position in Political Methodology,                                       |
| 2017-18 | Chair, M&P review committee for Department Chair   |
| 2020-21 | Member, Merit review committee for Professor Marek Kaminski  |
| 2020-21 | Member, Merit review committee for Professor Jeffrey Kopstein  |
| 2021-22 | Member, Merit review committee for Professor C. Anthony Smith  |

RECENT GRADUATE STUDENT SUPERVISION

Completed Ph.D.s

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|------|--|
| 2010 | Chair, Reuben Kline (now Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York, Stony Brook, formerly Max Weber Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, European University Institute)   |
| 2011 | Member, Honorine Lescieux-Katir, Department of Economics, University of Paris, II  |
| 2012 | Chair, Fatima Rahman (now Assistant Professor of Political Science, Lake Forest College, Illinois)   |
| 2012 | External Member, Ph. D. Prospectus Defense, Lorien Jasny (now Lecturer, University of Exeter, formerly Post-Doctoral Fellow, University of California, Davis, Department of Environmental Policy and Behavior).  |
| 2012 | Member, Michele Khoury-Agot, Department of Economics, University of Paris, II  |
| 2013 | Chair, Peter Miller (formerly Fulbright Fellow, University of Tampere, Finland; formerly Post-Doctoral Research Fellow, Program in Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, policy analyst, Brennan Center for Law and Justice) |
| 2013 | Member, Neilan Chaturvedi, (now Assistant Professor of Political Science Seattle University)   |
| 2014 | Member, Ryan Shirah (now Research Analyst, University of Tennessee)  |
| 2014 | Member, Moon-Young Choi  |
| 2015 | Chair, John Cuffe (now Research Analyst, U.S. Bureau of the Census)  |
| 2016 | Member, Jenny Garcia (now Asst. Professor, Oberlin College)  |
| 2016 | Member, Heather (Cox) Wickramachi (now International Economist analyst at the U.S. International Trade Commission)   |
| 2017 | Co-Chair, Eric Mosinger (Asst. Professor, Santa Clara University; formerly Post-Doctoral Fellow, Carleton University; formerly visiting Assistant  |

Professor at Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota)  
2019 Member, Ph.D committee and research supervision, Hannah Kim (now assistant Professor, University of Nebraska)  
2019 Member, Ph.D committee , Maneesh Arora (now Assistant Professor at Wellesley)  
2020 Chair, Ph.D. committee and research supervision, Jonathan Cervas (now in third year as Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Institute for Politics and Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University ( also 2021-22 Mapping Consultant, Pennsylvania Reapportionment Commission; 2022 Special Master, New York congressional and State Senate redistricting) .  
2021 Member, Ph.D. committee, Brian Kaiser  
2024 Member, Ph.D. committee, Ugurcan Evci

OTHER RECENT GRADUATE SUPERVISION

2015 Member, Qualifying Paper review committee, Cristopher Stoughton  
2017-18 Faculty Advisor, Nathan Chan  
2017-18 Research advice, Shauna Gillooly  
2018 research supervision, Nathan Cisneros  
2018-19 Ph.D. supervision, Matteo Caruso, visiting CSD Fellow, University of Lucca, Italy  
2019 member, Ph.D. advancement committee, Mark Bloxsom (Dept. of Economics)  
2020 member, Ph.D. advancement committee, Sargis Karavardanyan  
2022 research supervision, Haotian Chen, Marcelo Maciel, Zora Mihaley,, Morgan Spencer.

RECENT POST-DOCTORAL SUPERVISION

2017-18 Peter Miller (Peltason Chair Post-Doctoral Fellow)

Major Redistricting Cases in which Bernard Grofman Has  
Participated as an Expert Witness or Court-Appointed Consultant

| Consultant to   | Case Name   | Type   |
|---|---|--|
| Republican Party of Colorado  | <u>Carstens v. Lamm</u> , 543 F. Supp. 68 (D. Colorado, 1982)   | Congress: failure of the legislature to act  |
| Special Master, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York      | <u>Flateau v. Anderson</u> , 537 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. New York, 1982)   | Congress and both houses of state legislatures: failure of legislature to act; minority voting rights. |
| Republican Party of Hawaii  | <u>Travis v. King</u> , 552 F. Supp. 554; 552 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Hawaii, 1982)   | State legislature: equal population  |
| Democratic Party of Rhode Island and subsequently State of Rhode Island | <u>Holmes v. Burns</u> (Super. Ct., R.I. 1982) aff'd, No. 83-149 (R.I. S. Ct, April 10, 1984)   | State house: minority vote dilution, compactness, communities of interest                              |
| Republican National Committee   | <u>Badham v. Eu</u> , 721 F. 2d 1170 (D. Calif. 1983), dismissed for want of a federal claim, <i>cert.</i> denied   | Congress: partisan gerrymandering  |
| NAACP Legal Defense Fund  | <u>Gingles v. Edmisten</u> , consol. with <u>Pugh v. Brock</u> , 590 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. North Carolina, 1984) heard <i>sub nom.</i> <u>Thornburg v. Gingles</u> , 106 S. Ct. 2752, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) | Multimember districts in the state legislature; Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act                     |
| U.S. Department of Justice  | <u>South Carolina v. U.S.</u> (D.D.C., 1984) settled out of court by preclearance of a new plan for South Carolina Senate   | State Senate: Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act preclearance denial                                   |
| Consultant to   | Case Name   | Type   |

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|---|---|---|
| State of Indiana                                  | <u>Bandemer v. Davis</u> 603 F. Supp. 1479 (1984), (S.D. Indiana, 1983), reversed <i>sub nom</i> <u>Davis v. Bandemer</u> , 106 S. Ct. 2797, 106 U.S. 2797 (1986); initially consol. with <u>Indiana Branches of the NAACP v. Orr</u> 603 F. Supp. 1479 (1984) (S.D. Indiana, 1983) | State legislature: partisan gerrymandering, minority vote dilution        |
| City of Boston                                    | <u>Latino Political Action Committee v. City of Boston</u> , 609 F. Supp. 739 (D. Mass. 1985)   | Boston City council: minority vote dilution                               |
| U.S. Department of Justice                        | <u>Ketchum v. Byrne II</u> (D. Illinois 1985), settled by consent decree  | Chicago City Council: minority vote dilution                              |
| Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund | <u>Gomez v. City of Watsonville</u> (D. Calif., 1986), 863 F. 2d 1407 (9th cir. 1988) <i>cert. denied</i> , 109 S.Ct. 1534 (1989)   | Watsonville City Council: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act              |
| U.S. Department of Justice                        | <u>U.S. v. City of Los Angeles</u> (D. Calif., 1986), settled out of court by adoption of a new plan for L.A. City Council with an additional majority Hispanic seat  | Los Angeles City Council: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act              |
| NAACP Legal Defense Fund                          | <u>McGhee v. Granville County</u> , No. 87-29-CIV-5) (E.D. North Carolina 2/5/88); 860 F. 2d 110 (4th circuit 1988)   | Granville County Board of Supervisors: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act |
| U.S. Department of Justice                        | <u>Garza v. County of Los Angeles Board of Supervisors</u> 918 F. 2d 763 (9th cir. 1990); new plan adopted by the court   | County Board: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act                          |

| Consultant to  | Case Name   | Type   |
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| Republican National Committee                                      | <u>Pope et al. v. Blue et al.</u> 809 F. Supp. 392 (D. N.C, Western District, Charlotte Division, 1992)   | Congressional redistricting in North Carolina: 14th Amendment  |
| Republican Party of Wisconsin                                      | <u>Prosser et al. v. Election Board of State of Wisconsin</u> 793 F. Supp. 859 (D.Wisc., 1992)  | Wisconsin state legislative redistricting: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act  |
| State of North Carolina  | <u>Republican Party v. Martin</u> 980 F2d 943 (4 <sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)   | State-wide judicial elections in the State of North Carolina; partisan gerrymandering  |
| Minority plaintiffs  | <u>Garcia v. City of Los Angeles</u> , (D. Los Angeles, 1996)   | City of Los Angeles Charter Commission: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act   |
| Republican Party of Wisconsin                                      | <u>Arrington et al. v. Elections Bd. of State of Wisconsin</u> 173 F. Supp. 2d 856 U.S. (D. Wisconsin, 2002)  | Wisconsin State legislative districting, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act  |
| Special Master, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York | <u>Rodriguez et al. v. Pataki et al.</u> , (S.D. N. Y., 2002) ; legislature chooses to draw new plan  | Congress; failure of legislature to act; minority voting rights.   |
| Special Master, US District Court, Georgia                         | <u>Larios v. Cox</u> 305 F Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. GA 2004)   | Georgia legislative districts; one person, one vote.   |
| <u>Government Accountability Board of Wisconsin</u>                | <u>Baldus et al. v. Members of the Government Accountability Board of Wisconsin</u> , Federal District Court, Case No. 11-CV-562<br>JPS-DPW-RMD. March 22, 2012 | Wisconsin legislative districts  |
| <u>Three judge federal panel, 4<sup>th</sup> Circuit</u>           | <u>Perhsonhuballah v. Alcorn</u> , Case 3:13-cv-00678, District Court, Eastern District of Virginia 2015; 155 F. Supp. 3d 552 (2016)                            | Service to the Court as Special Master to redraw Virginia's 3rd congressional district after a previous finding that it was racially motivated |
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| Consultant to                                 | Case Name   | Type   |
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| <u>single judge Federal District Court</u>    | <u>Navajo Nation v. San Juan County</u> , Utah, 2017 No. 18-4005 (10th Cir. 2019)   | Service to the Court as Special Master to redraw County Commission and School Board districts after a previous finding that these were racially motivated                |
| <u>Three judge federal panel, 4th Circuit</u> | <u>Golden-Bethune Hill v. VA Board of Elections</u> , Case 3:14cv-852, District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, opinion filed February 13, 2019; <i>Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill</i> , 587 U.S. (2019).   | Service to the Court as Special Master to redraw 11 House of Delegate districts in Virginia after a previous finding that they were racially motivated                   |
| <u>Single judge federal district court</u>    | <u>Wright v. Sumter County Gorgia</u> , Case No.: 1:14-CV-42 (WLS), 2020; No. 15-13628 (11 <sup>TH</sup> Circuit), October 27, 2020)  | Service to the Court as Special Master to redraw 7 School Board districts after a previous finding that they violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act                 |
| <u>Single judge federal district court</u>    | <i>Holloway v. City of Virginia Beach</i> CIV 2:18-cv-0069 (E.D. Virginia, Norfolk Division), September 26, 2021.   | Service to the Court as Special Master to redraw City Council districts after a previous finding that they violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act                   |
| <u>Virginia State Supreme Court</u>           | <i>In re Virginia Legislative and Congressional Redistricting</i> , December 28, 2021 (Report co-authored by Sean Trende) <a href="https://www.vacourts.gov/courts/scv/districting/2021_virginia_redistricting_memo.pdf">https://www.vacourts.gov/courts/scv/districting/2021_virginia_redistricting_memo.pdf</a> | Service to the Court as co-Special Master to redraw legislative and congressional districts in Virginia after the legislature failed to enact a plan in a timely fashion |
| <u>North Carolina State Supreme Court</u>     | <i>Harper v. Hall</i> 2022-NCSC-17 No. 413PA21 February 14, 2022  | Mapping consultant to the three Special Masters appointed by the Court   |
| <u>Ohio Attorney General</u>                  | <i>League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm.</i> , Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-342.   | Mapping consultant for legislative redistricting   |



| Consultant to  | Case Name                             | Type  |
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| <u>Wisconsin State Supreme Court</u>                     | <i>Clarke</i>                         | Mapping consultant (with Jonathan Cervas) for legislative redistricting |
| <u>U.S. District Court, Western District of Michigan</u> | <i>Agee v. Benson</i> No. 1:22-cv-272 | Reviewing Special Master for legislative redistricting                  |
|  |                                       |   |